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Women have acquired substantial rights under the Constitution
interpreted by the federal courts.1 These include the right to be
* Justice Anthony M. Kennedy Professor of Law & Director, Capital Center for Law &
Policy, University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Thanks to the Section on Women in
Legal Education for the opportunity to present this paper at the AALS 2020 Annual Meeting
in Washington, D.C. as part of a panel addressing the questions: A Century Since Suffrage:
How Did We Get Here? Where Will We Go? How Will We Get There? Thanks to Frank
Gevurtz, Matt Jacobs, Marc LeForestier, and John Sprankling for helpful comments, and to
Matt Urban and Emma Woidtke for excellent research and cite-checking assistance.
1. I delivered the talk, which became this paper, on a panel focused on women’s rights.
Most of what I have to say about existing doctrine, and the impact of doctrinal changes on
women’s rights, applies more generally to the rights of historically disadvantaged minorities
and other groups with less power than others in the private ordering.
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treated the same as men under the Equal Protection Clause2 and
the right to make certain intimate and reproductive choices under
the Due Process Clause.3 But the federal courts are no longer a
hospitable environment in which to argue to expand women’s
rights.4 The Court has always limited the scope of the equal pro-
tection guarantee to prohibit only purposefully equal treatment by
the government.5 Now, the Court may be inclined to contract its
interpretation of Congress’s power to choose to implement a broader
equality right for women, or for other historically disadvantaged
minorities.6 Existing interpretations of the scope of intimate and
reproductive rights guaranteed by the Constitution are in danger.7
Recent statutory interpretations expand the rights of employers to
2. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that women must be ad-
mitted to Virginia Military Institute according to the same qualification criteria that apply
to men); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976) (holding that sex-based classifications
are subject to heightened, intermediate scrutiny).
3. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (re-affirming a con-
stitutional right to choose abortion prior to viability); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (hold-
ing that a state may not criminalize abortion prior to viability); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a state may not criminalize use of contraceptives by married
women).
4. Many women choose to align their lives and identities according to religious beliefs
and to structure their conduct according to what those beliefs require. Many other women,
however, do not choose religious beliefs as their source of meaning and identity or as their
guide to what roles they should occupy, in private or in public, or to how they should other-
wise behave. Women’s rights protect the abilities of all women to believe what they choose
and to structure their conduct to fulfill those beliefs. Because women choose to believe and
behave in many different ways, religious beliefs, and the conduct they mandate or forbid,
when enacted into law or interpreted to define the scope of a constitutional rights guarantee,
restrict the rights of women as a class.
5. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271–73 (1979) (upholding a Massachusetts
statute preferring veterans against an equal protection claim that the statute discriminated
against the female plaintiffs based on their sex); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976) (rejecting “the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether
it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional [s]olely because it has a ra-
cially disproportionate impact”).
6. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S.
519 (2015) (upholding authority of Congress to create disparate impact liability in housing
law, with Justice Kennedy, who has now been replaced by Justice Kavanaugh, providing the
fifth vote); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (warning of a
coming “war between disparate impact and equal protection”); Greater New Orleans Fair
Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 639 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting
disparate impact liability, with Judge Kavanaugh joining the majority opinion).
7. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (joining the majority holding that the abortion restrictions are invalid, but re-
jecting the balancing test set out by the Court in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136
S. Ct. 2292 (2016)); see also June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2142 (Thomas, Alito, Gor-
such, and Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing, inter alia, that abortion providers lack stand-
ing to assert women’s rights).
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avoid complying with laws expanding their employees’ reproductive
rights.8
Now, the Court’s interpretations are expanding the scopes of the
First Amendment speech and religious liberty rights.9 The Consti-
tution’s individual rights guarantees are not absolute. In its deter-
mination of the scope of an individual right, the Court must neces-
sarily interpret a balance between the individual’s right to assert it
and the power of democratically elected officials and bodies to im-
plement policy choices, which balance the many individual and pub-
lic rights impacted in an interaction differently. As the scope of
individual rights expand, the authority of democratically elected of-
ficials and entities to regulate the individual conduct protected by
the rights guarantee contracts. With respect to the First Amend-
ment rights of speech and religious liberty specifically, the Court’s
expanding interpretations of their scopes contract the power of
democratically elected entities at all government levels to enact and
administer laws that adjust private market power relations for the
purpose of implementing various forms of civil rights guarantees.10
The shift in interpretation threatens women’s ability to retain
and expand democratically enacted rights.11 But a direct assault on
the changing doctrine is unlikely to succeed. No Archimedean point
exists from which to argue the fundamental soundness of the
8. See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367 (2020) (holding that the Affordable Care Act authorized the Health Resources and Ser-
vices Administration to grant exemptions to employers with religious or moral objections to
providing no-cost contraceptive coverage to their employees); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (holding that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act ex-
empted “closely held” for-profit corporations from the obligation to provide employees with
contraceptive coverage under the Affordable Care Act).
9. See Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, NIFLA v. Becerra: A Seismic Decision Pro-
tecting Occupational Speech, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 197, 197–98 (2018) (describing the
Court’s decision in Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018), as
“cement[ing] the Roberts Court as the most libertarian in our nation’s history on free-speech
issues”); Linda Greenhouse, The Many Dimensions of the Chief Justice’s Triumphant Term,
N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2020), https://nyti.ms/32nTaML (observing Chief Justice Roberts’ “pro-
ject” of expanding religious liberty rights and commenting, as to three religion cases in the
2019 Term, that they “went considerably further than they needed to, each one taking and
running with one of the [C]ourt’s recent applicable precedents”).
10. See Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L.
REV. F. 165, 167 (2015) (“It is no exaggeration to observe that the First Amendment has
become a powerful engine of constitutional deregulation.”); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise
Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1453 55 (2015) (comparing Free Exercise doctrine to
the “ideal of private ordering and the resistance to redistribution” found in the “widely criti-
cized use of freedom of contract to strike down economic regulation at the turn of the last
century”).
11. Louis Michael Seidman, Can Free Speech Be Progressive?, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2219,
2230 (2018) (observing that victims of the free speech expansion include “proponents of cam-
paign finance reform, opponents of cigarette addiction, the LBGTQ community, labor unions,
animal-rights advocates, environmentalists, targets of hate speech, and abortion providers”).
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balance between the exercise of democratic power and individuals’
power to avoid it that the Court interprets into the expanding
rights, or the specific methods of interpretation it employs. For
many of us, the pedigree of Court composition, conferred by neutral
rules of procedure, consistently applied, no longer exists either.12
Still, the Court must be concerned about some version of legitimacy,
which distinguishes its interpretations from political decision mak-
ing.13 What remains, in the interpretation of the expanding First
Amendment rights, is the legitimacy that may be obtained by con-
sistent application of core methodologies for articulating and apply-
ing rules and for evaluating evidence.14
The longstanding doctrine of women’s rights under the Equal
Protection Clause reveals these methodologies.15 Courts of chang-
ing compositions over decades have articulated and embraced the
doctrine of women’s equal protection rights.16 Its core methodolo-
gies transcend the particular choices of weight between individual
rights and government authority, and among interpretive method-
ologies. One element of the core methodology stems from the strug-
gle to change the Court’s interpretation of the scope of women’s
right to equal protection fromwhat it was according to tradition and
history, and what it had to be to implement the enduring constitu-
tional principle in altered social and economic circumstances.17
This is that religious belief, and the conduct it requires or con-
demns, does not determine the scope of individual conduct protected
by a rights guarantee not aimed explicitly at protecting religious
liberty.
12. The rules do not state whether a President’s nominee should receive a hearing and
be confirmed during an election year, but whatever the rule is, the Senate must apply it
consistently. SeeU.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (entrusting the Senate with the duty to confirm
Supreme Court nominees); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (conferring discretion on the Senate
to make its own rules, subject to the unwritten norm that the rules be consistently applied).
But see Carl Hulse, For McConnell, Ginsburg’s Death Prompts Stark Turnabout from 2016
Stance, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/us/mitch-mcconnell-rbg-
trump.html (Nov. 3, 2020) (comparing approaches to the nominations of Chief Judge Merrick
Garland and Justice Amy Coney Barrett).
13. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 708 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The legit-
imacy of th[e] Court ultimately rests ‘upon the respect accorded to its judgments.’ . . . [which]
flows from the perception—and reality—that [the Court] exercise[s] humility and restraint
in deciding cases according to the Constitution and law.”) (citation omitted).
14. See infra Part II (examining the Court’s consistency in expanding interpretations of
the First Amendment rights).
15. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (initiating a change in doctrine in the early
1970s by holding that the equal protection guarantee prohibited a state from using sex as a
classification to qualify estate administrators).
16. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017); United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
17. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693 (holding that laws that allocate benefits accord-
ing to “stereotypes about women’s domestic roles” violate the equal protection principle).
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The second element is evidentiary. By the Court’s interpretation,
equal protection of the laws means equal treatment by the govern-
ment according to protected traits. A developed methodology exists
for evaluating evidence to determine whether government actions
disadvantage women because they are women, or because of an
overlapping characteristic, which dissolves an inference of discrim-
inatory purpose. A finding of discriminatory purpose to disad-
vantage individuals because they exhibit a protected trait plays the
same critical role of shifting the balance between individual rights
and government authority in particular applications under the free
speech and religious liberty guarantees.
We can use both of these elements of methodology to examine the
consistency of the Court’s expanding interpretations of the First
Amendment rights with the structure that defines the scope of
women’s constitutional rights. Part I provides brief background.
Section I.A. describes the evolution of women’s equal protection
rights and the core methodologies embedded in the Court’s reason-
ing and evaluations of evidence. Section I.B. sets out the doctrine
that defines the expanding scope of the free speech and religious
liberty rights. Part II uses the example of the Court’s recent deci-
sion in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra
(NIFLA)18 to examine the consistency of the Court’s expanding in-
terpretations of the First Amendment rights with the structure that
defines the scope of women’s constitutional rights. Section II.A. de-
scribes the doctrinal dilemma posed by the facts and the Court’s
resolution. Section II.B. examines the reasons offered by the Court
for its critical doctrinal distinction between licensed professional
client counseling at pregnancy centers and other types of speech
that the government may regulate more extensively and identifies
the creep of religious belief into the definition of the scope of the
free speech right. Section II.C. identifies inconsistencies in the
Court’s evaluation of evidence of discriminatory purpose when reli-
giously motivated speakers challenge official action with the meth-
odology that limits the scope of women’s equal protection rights.
These seemingly skewed evaluations of official motivations not only
advantage the claims of individuals asserting the expanding rights,
but threaten to chill criticism by official decision makers of reli-
giously motivated conduct, which harms women or others and for
that reason violates public policies, by presenting or construing
statements criticizing the conduct and its harmful consequences as
expressions to discriminate because of the religious motivation.
18. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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I. THEMETHODOLOGY ANDDOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
The Court uses a common methodology to interpret the scope of
individual rights. The guarantees within the Constitution’s rights
can appear absolute. But they cannot possibly be. Government ac-
tions abridge individuals’ liberty to act in countless ways, which im-
plicate the constitutional rights guarantees. The primary realm es-
tablished by the Constitution for balancing individual interests is
the political process. The Court’s interpretation of the scope of an
individual right necessarily balances the individual interest in ab-
solute freedom of action with democratic government’s authority
and responsibility to balance the many rights held by members of
its electorate differently. By means of distinctions among circum-
stances where an individual’s exercise of a right and a government
action conflict, the Court determines levels of the rigor of judicial
review of the justification for the government’s action. These dis-
tinctions and the levels of judicial review they invoke form the doc-
trine, which defines the scope of the right. Circumstances that pose
a high danger that the government’s action violates the core protec-
tion of a rights guarantee provoke strict judicial scrutiny of the gov-
ernment’s explanation for its action, while circumstances that do
not provoke a lower level of review. The Court must find the dis-
tinctions among circumstances that it interprets into doctrine by
tracing them to implementing the core principles that underpin the
rights guarantee. When the Court changes the distinctions that
mark the balance between the scope of the rights-holder and the
government’s authority to regulate, it must do so according to this
same methodology that legitimates the newly found distinction as
an act of interpretation rather than of judicial will.
A. Equal Protection
The development of the doctrine of women’s equal protection
rights illustrates and adds nuance to the common methodology of
interpreting the scope of individual rights. The first nuance exists
when the Court interprets the key distinctions that determine the
level of judicial review into doctrine. The Equal Protection Clause
demands “equal protection” of all “persons” within a jurisdiction,
but the doctrine has always hinged on distinctions among groups
according to their characteristics. The Court cannot carefully re-
view all the many classifications in law, and should not, because the
Constitution commits those policy decisions to the democratic
60 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 59
process. So, by means of levels of review, the Court has segregated
the classifications into those that presumptively violate the core
principles of the Equal Protection Clause and those that do not. The
history of the Equal Protection Clause shows an intent by those who
wrote and ratified it to protect former slaves, so from the beginning
of its interpretation, the Court distinguished legal classifications
that disadvantaged that group from other types of classifications.19
The Court quickly generalized this protection to all types of racial
classifications and reviews them under strict scrutiny.20
It took a century after the Equal Protection Clause became a part
of the Constitution, and fifty years after women got the right to vote,
for the Court to interpret it to require equal treatment of men and
women.21 Sex classifications did not appear as presumptively vio-
lating Equal Protection Clause principles at the time the amend-
ment became a part of the Constitution.22 Instead, these classifica-
tions reflected widespread attitudes about the different roles of
women and men in society, differences that the Court viewed as
normal and natural, and so within the discretion of democratically
elected governments to implement through law.23 The Court
changed the doctrine of the Equal Protection Clause, raising the
level of review of sex-based classifications, when it came to view
these classifications as “arbitrary,” rather than grounded in differ-
ences that relate sufficiently to fulfilling public purposes.24
19. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (stating that the aim of the Equal
Protection Clause was “against discrimination because of race or color,” not against distinc-
tions based on such attributes as sex, land ownership, age, or educational qualifications).
20. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese race and ancestry); see also
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying “the most rigid scrutiny” to
a classification based on Japanese ancestry, although upholding it).
21. The Fourteenth Amendment, which contains the Equal Protection Clause, was rati-
fied in 1868. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Nineteenth Amendment, which granted women
the right to vote, was ratified in 1920. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. The Court began its inter-
pretation of a right to equal treatment for women into the Equal Protection Clause in Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
22. See The Originalist, CAL. LAW. (Jan. 2011), https://podcast.uctv.tv/webdocuments/le-
gally-speaking/11_01LegallySpeaking_Scalia.pdf (quoting Justice Scalia as remarking: “No-
body ever thought that [prohibiting sex discrimination is what the Equal Protection Clause]
meant. Nobody ever voted for that.”).
23. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961) (upholding a state law requiring women
to opt in to jury service, observing that a “woman is still regarded as the center of home and
family life”).
24. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve im-
portant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (“A classification ‘must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.’”).
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In changing the significance of the sex distinction in doctrine
from what it had been, the Court followed the common methodology
of tracing the newly located distinction to implementing the core
equal protection right. Distinctions based on sex, a four-justice plu-
rality explained, in many relevant ways resembled the race distinc-
tions, which the clause was clearly intended to eliminate.25 To
make this change, the Court had to reject “archaic and overbroad”
generalizations about the relative economic situations of men and
women, and “outdated misconceptions concerning the role of fe-
males in the home rather than in the ‘marketplace and world of
ideas’” as determinative of the relevance of the sex trait to imple-
menting the equal protection guarantee.26 In a long series of opin-
ions, the Court reiterated that stereotypes, old notions, and tradi-
tional ways of understanding the socially appropriate roles of men
and women27 do not determine the scope of the constitutional right
when the circumstances to which the Court must apply the core
principle that drives the right have changed.28
These traditional ideas about the appropriate role and conduct of
women very often stem from, and mirror, religious beliefs.29 So, the
rejection of old ideas as guides to the scope of application of the
equal protection guarantee is a rejection of religious beliefs about
appropriate individual conduct as determinative when interpreting
the scope of the constitutional right. This recognition that religious
beliefs and practices do not determine the scope of individual
25. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (comparing sex to race as “an im-
mutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth,” and noting that neither
slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suits in their own name for much
of the nineteenth century).
26. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198 99 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975))
(first citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689 n.23; and then citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 643 (1975)).
27. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (noting that the law
before it “date[s] from an era when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife with overbroad gen-
eralizations about the way men and women are”); Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 736 (2003) (rejecting laws based on “[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles”).
28. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (“[N]ew insights and societal understandings
can reveal unjustified inequality . . . that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”) (alter-
ation in original).
29. See Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 69 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring) (reasoning that a restriction of public gatherings to ten people “might operate to exclude
all women, considering [ten] men are necessary to establish a minyan, or a quorum” in the
Orthodox Jewish community); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (invalidating a Utah law
requiring parents to support men, but not women, past age eighteen); David Crary, Women
Strive for Larger Roles in Male-Dominated Religions, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://apnews.com/article/3dc6b0999bf04614b1de21863cbfdd66; Tanya Riches & Mark Jen-
nings, Explainer: Why Some Churches Teach That Women Are ‘Separate but Equal’, THE
CONVERSATION, https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-some-churches-teach-that-wome
n-are-separate-but-equal-64305 (Dec. 21, 2016, 7:41 PM).
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conduct protected by a rights guarantee other than religious liberty
is apparent in the doctrine of the Due Process Clause as well.30
The second nuance of methodology that stems from interpreta-
tion of the equal protection guarantee involves the evidence suffi-
cient to show that a government entity acted with a purpose to dis-
tinguish individuals according to protected traits in a particular
case such that the Court presumes a constitutional violation and
raises the level of scrutiny. The equality right that women and
other minorities have achieved by means of dynamic interpretation
of the equal protection guarantee is substantial. However, it is also
substantially limited by the Court’s doctrinal decision that the
equal protection right refers to freedom from purposeful govern-
ment action and does not include freedom from disproportionate
harms imposed by laws on members of a protected class.31 So, even
an extraordinarily strong showing that a law disproportionately
disadvantages a protected class, like women, is not enough, by it-
self, to cause the Court to review the law according to the standard
that applies to explicit sex-based classifications.32 Mere awareness
by a government decision maker that a law’s disadvantageous effect
will fall dramatically disproportionately,33 or even exclusively,34 on
women does not show a sufficient purpose if a valid public policy
objective can explain the government’s choice.35 Sufficient evidence
from the circumstances of the impact or of other types must show
that the government “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
30. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672 (2015) (acknowledging that “[m]any
who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honor-
able religious or philosophical premises” but holding that “sincere, personal [beliefs]” violate
the rights of other people when “enacted [into] law and public policy”); Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (acknowledging “beliefs” about the consequences
of abortion “for the life . . . that is aborted” and the “vision” of woman as noble mother, which
has been “dominant . . . in the course of our history and our culture,” even as it distinguishes
these determinants of difference from the norm appropriate to guide its interpretation of the
scope of the constitutional liberty right, which is that government actions must preserve the
same right for men and women to shape their destinies according to their own “conception[s]
of [their] spiritual imperatives and [their] place[s] in society”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (rejecting an interpretation that would find a fetus is a “person” with a constitutional
life or liberty right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating state ban on dis-
tribution of contraceptives to unmarried people); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (invalidating state ban on the use of contraceptives).
31. SeeWashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
32. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (refraining from applying heightened re-
view to the exclusion of pregnancy from California’s disability compensation program despite
disadvantaging only women).
33. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
34. See Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion of pregnancy from California’s disability
compensation program).
35. See Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (rewarding veterans for their service); Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(limiting disability payments to limit the amount of required contributions by employees and
employers).
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action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group” whose members exhibit a pro-
tected trait.36 In rare instances, where no valid public purpose
could explain a strong statistical showing of adverse impact, the
Court has found administrative decisions targeting, or electoral dis-
tricts drawn for the purpose to discriminate on the basis of, race.37
But where a plausible purpose other than disadvantaging a pro-
tected class exists, a purpose to disadvantage individuals according
to a protected trait, is very difficult to prove.38 Seemingly, a show-
ing based on impact alone must demonstrate that both the class
benefited by the law and burdened by it are grouped according to
the protected trait. So, a showing that the benefits of a law accrue
almost exclusively to one class, like men, is not enough, if both men
and women are in the disadvantaged class.39 Similarly, a showing
that the burdens of a law fall exclusively on one class, like women,
is not enough, if not all women fall within the class that experiences
the burden.40 This very high evidentiary threshold for showing an
unconstitutional purpose to discriminate on the basis of a protected
trait substantially limits the scope of women’s equal protection
right.
B. Free Speech
Like the equal protection guarantee, the Court has qualified, by
interpretation, the First Amendment’s seemingly absolute mandate
that the government “make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”41 The core distinction that identifies the meaning of
the right stems from the Equal Protection Clause and segregates
laws according to whether they depend for their application on the
36. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
37. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding a local act altering the shape
of a city from a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure that removed all but a few of the 400
Black voters and no white voters constituted unconstitutional discrimination); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (noting that to raise
a prima facie case of race-based prosecution, it was not sufficient to show that all the defend-
ants in crack cocaine cases were Black, defendant needed to provide evidence “that similarly
situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987) (holding that a defendant must show that his decision maker acted with discrim-
inatory purpose and so a detailed and inclusive statistical study showing Georgia jurors
across a series of years consider race in imposing the death penalty was not sufficient to show
that the jury that imposed defendant’s death sentence acted with this purpose).
39. See Feeney, 442 U.S. 256.
40. See Aiello, 417 U.S. 484.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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content of the speech.42 The content distinction identifies apparent
government censorship of ideas, and thereby implements the core
Free Speech Clause’s purposes, which include facilitating citizen
participation in the democratic process; ensuring an uninhibited
marketplace in which speakers and listeners may exchange infor-
mation, ideas, and opinions about the whole range of human activ-
ities; and promoting individual self-development.43 The determina-
tion of whether a law is content-based or content-neutral deter-
mines the level of scrutiny the Court applies.44 Content-based re-
strictions are “presumptively unconstitutional” and subject to strict
scrutiny.45 But the Court has interpreted many exceptions to this
rule, when the circumstances of the individual speech and govern-
ment regulation trace differently to implementing the core princi-
ples that explain the existence of the right.46
And the Court’s interpretation of the identity and location of
these distinctions has changed. In recent years, the Court has ex-
panded the scope of laws it deems to discriminate according to con-
tent,47 and viewpoint,48 and are therefore subject to the most rigor-
ous judicial scrutiny. The Court identified viewpoint discrimination
as “an egregious form of content discrimination” in the circum-
stances of a public university, which excluded publications prose-
lytizing religion from distribution from a student activities fund
otherwise generally available to publications by student groups.49
“The government must abstain from regulating speech when the
42. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (holding a sign ordinance lim-
iting size, duration, and location of temporary signs directing the public toward events loosely
defined as a meeting of a nonprofit group violated free speech rights); Police Dep’t v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of
a school made an unconstitutional exemption for peaceful labor picketing but not all forms
of peaceful picketing).
43. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 534–35 (1980); C. Edwin
Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L.
REV. 293 (1982); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
44. Gilbert, 576 U.S. at 163.
45. Id. The Court continues to apply a lower level of scrutiny to some scope of commercial
speech. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
46. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“Those few categories of speech that the government can regulate or punish—for
instance, fraud, defamation, or incitement—are well established within our constitutional
tradition.”); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (setting
out the types of forums and the different rules that apply to regulations of speech in them).
47. Gilbert, 576 U.S. at 162 (holding that a law that distinguishes according to the con-
tent of directional signs is subject to strict scrutiny).
48. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (holding that a law prohibiting issuing a trademark to content
that disparages individuals or groups according to certain traits is viewpoint-based).
49. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825, 829 (1995)
(university excluded funding for “religious activit[ies]” defined as those that “primarily pro-
motes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality”) (alteration
in original).
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specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction,” the Court explained.50
The Court has interpreted laws penalizing speech critical of reli-
gious beliefs, institutions, and practices as viewpoint-based and
subject to strict scrutiny as well.51
The Court has expanded its interpretations of the constitutional
protection for commercial speech and other speech by corporations
and actors in the commercial marketplace. It has held, and ex-
panded upon holdings, that payment of money to produce speech is
fully protected as speech;52 that corporations have the same speech
rights as individuals;53 and that commercial speech should, in in-
creasing types of instances, receive the same level of constitutional
protection as public issue speech.54 These latter expansions build
on a changed interpretation of the level of constitutional protection
for commercial speech articulated by the Court in the mid-1970s.55
At that time, the Court distinguished regulation of commercial
speech from regulation of other types of speech, which provokes
strict scrutiny.56 The value of commercial and corporate speech, the
Court explained back then, stems primarily from its value to listen-
ers.57 More recently, the Court has merged the interests of listeners
with full protection of corporate speakers when linking its
50. Id. at 829.
51. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (invalidating intentional infliction of emotional
distress conviction for speakers criticizing, among other things, the conduct of officials within
the Catholic Church); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940) (holding breach of
the peace conviction unconstitutional applied to speaker attacking “all organized religious
systems as instruments of Satan,” and “singl[ing] out the Roman Catholic Church for stric-
tures couched in terms which naturally would offend not only persons of that persuasion, but
all others who respect the honestly held religious faith of their fellows”).
52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
53. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
54. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts
of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 158 (2010) (“[C]orporate speakers soon became
the principal beneficiaries of [the Court’s holding that the Constitution protects commercial
speech].”).
55. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (finding a strong interest in the “free
flow of commercial information”).
56. Id. at 771 n.24 (finding “commonsense differences” between commercial speech and
other types, which “suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that
the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired”).
57. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (“The inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of
its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”); Va. State Bd. of Phar-
macy, 425 U.S. at 766 (listing the “substantial individual and societal interests” that support
constitutional protection for commercial speech).
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expanding interpretations of the right to implementing constitu-
tional principles.58
The same strict scrutiny that applies to content-based speech re-
strictions applies to content-based compulsions that individuals in-
clude messages mandated by the government in their speech. “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein,” the Court em-
phasized as it invalidated a flag salute imposed on a school child
whose parents’ religious beliefs forbade the conduct.59 A “Live Free
or Die” license plate motto forced upon a driver who found the mes-
sage “morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent” fared
no better.60 “A system which secures the right to proselytize reli-
gious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the con-
comitant right to decline to foster such concepts,” the Court ex-
plained, and the difference between an active flag salute, and pas-
sive display of the motto, was merely “one of degree.”61 The license
plate-display requirement, like the salute, “forces an individual, as
part of his daily life indeed constantly while his automobile is in
public view to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”62 The Court has
invalidated other government mandates that individuals deliver or
affirm ideological messages.63
The Court has, however, distinguished certain types of infor-
mation-delivery requirements imposed on product and service pro-
viders, holding that a lower level of judicial review applies and,
therefore, that democratically elected bodies have greater constitu-
tional authority to impose them for the purpose of achieving public
purposes. Soon after raising the constitutional protection for com-
mercial speech, the Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
58. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 41 (“[T]he Government may commit a constitutional
wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking the right to speak from
some and giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of
the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s
voice. The Government may not by these means deprive the public of the right and privilege
to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.”).
59. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
60. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
61. Id. at 714 15.
62. Id. at 715.
63. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013) (statement
of opposition to prostitution); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc.,
515 U.S. 557 (1995) (including a gay contingent in a privately organized parade); Mia. Herald
Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (speech opposing newspaper editors’ viewpoints);
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. 624 (child in school required to salute the flag).
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Counsel upheld the constitutionality of a state disciplinary rule re-
quiring any attorney advertisement that mentioned contingent fee
rates to disclose that clients might still be required to pay litigation
costs.64 It interpreted a distinction between speech compulsions im-
posed on public issue and commercial speech,65 and between regu-
lations that restrict commercial speech and those that require dis-
closure of additional information.66 The Court described the state
rule as requiring that advertisements include “purely factual and
uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . ser-
vices will be available.”67 Linking the distinction to constitutional
principle, the Court noted “the extension of First Amendment pro-
tection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to
consumers of the information such speech provides, [so] appellant’s
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular
factual information in his advertising is minimal.”68 In recent
years, and in tandem with the Court’s interpretations applying
“heightened scrutiny” to an expanding scope of commercial speech
restrictions,69 corporate litigants have aggressively—and fre-
quently successfully—litigated to narrow application of the Zau-
derer exception.70 But still, the exception remains, along with the
reality that legislative bodies and government agencies impose a
wide variety of information-delivery requirements on product and
service vendors.71
64. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
65. Id. at 637 (observing that “‘commercial speech’ is entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded ‘noncommercial
speech’”).
66. Id. at 650–53 (rejecting the attorney’s argument that “precisely the same inquiry as
determining the validity of . . . restrictions on advertising content” should apply to determine
the constitutionality of the disclosure requirement).
67. Id. at 651.
68. Id. (citation omitted). The Court also noted that “because disclosure requirements
trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech,
‘warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the
possibility of consumer confusion or deception.’” Id. (alterations in original). Without clearly
identifying a level of review, the Court noted that “unjustified or unduly burdensome disclo-
sure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial
speech,” but that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure re-
quirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consum-
ers.” Id.
69. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
70. Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2ID0Wov (“[B]usinesses mount[ed] First Amendment chal-
lenges to gun control laws, securities regulations, country-of-origin labels, graphic cigarette
warnings and limits on off-label drug marketing.”).
71. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376 (2018) (“‘[W]e do
not question the legality of health and safety warnings long considered permissible, or purely
factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial products.”); Fredrik Gronkvist,
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A plurality of the Court articulated the other exception, some-
what offhandedly, in the context of state-mandated information dis-
closure to clients by abortion providers. In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the plurality addressed the
constitutionality of a state requirement that abortion providers in-
form their patients of “the nature of the procedure, the health risks
of the abortion and of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age
of the unborn child,’” as well as the availability of printed material
prepared by the State, which provided information about the fetus
and assistance available to support raising a child.72 The plurality
addressed two claims with respect to the information-delivery re-
quirement. The first was whether it violated the new “undue bur-
den” standard the plurality interpreted as marking a violation of
the woman’s right to choose the procedure. In determining that the
disclosure requirements at issue did not do so, the plurality explic-
itly rejected prior Court holdings that only a purpose to protect
women’s health could support required disclosure. It held that
states may select information and mandate disclosure for the pur-
pose of protecting fetal life and “to persuade her to choose childbirth
over abortion,” at least so long as the information required to be
presented is “truthful and not misleading.”73
The Casey plurality only briefly addressed the abortion providers’
claim that the mandated disclosures violated their Free Speech
Clause rights. “[T]he physician’s First Amendment rights not to
speak are implicated,” it reasoned, “but only as part of the practice
of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State . . . .”74 The reference to states’ power to license and regulate
medical professionals, although conclusory, identifies the same type
of doctrinal distinction as more fully explicated in Zauderer be-
tween circumstances in which the Constitution commands that
speakers’ rights to speak without restraint prevail and those where
the Constitution permits democratically elected bodies to choose to
implement a different balance of interests between speakers and
listeners for the purpose of protecting the health, safety, and wel-
fare of their citizenry, as determined through their political pro-
cesses. For decades, states with democratically elected majorities
that oppose abortion have relied on the discretion the Casey excep-
tion interprets to enforce many different types of information-
United States Product Labeling Requirements: An Overview, COMPLIANCEGATE (Dec. 16,
2020), https://www.compliancegate.com/united-states-product-labeling-requirements/.
72. 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992).
73. Id. at 877–79, 882.
74. Id. at 884 (citation omitted).
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disclosure requirements for the purpose of persuading women not
to choose abortion, which makes women’s access to the procedure
more time-consuming, cumbersome, and expensive.75
C. Religious Liberty
The Constitution contains two religious liberty guarantees. The
government may “make no law” either “respecting the establish-
ment of religion” or “prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”76
The Establishment Clause limits the assistance governments may
provide to religious entities generally or to particular religious
sects. The Free Exercise Clause limits the extent to which laws
may restrict religious practice. As with the other provisions, “no
law” does not mean that governments must avoid assisting or dis-
advantaging religion or those who practice it. Instead, reflecting
the common methodology, the Court has interpreted key distinc-
tions into the doctrine. These distinctions implement the balance
between rights-holders and government authority by separating
circumstances of aid and burden to religion into those that pre-
sumptively violate core principles and those that do not, and
thereby establishing levels of judicial review. The doctrine of the
two clauses is complex and in flux.77 Over the past few decades, and
at an accelerating pace, the Court has expanded religious liberty
rights by means of changing interpretations of the scope of both
clauses. At this time, the core distinction between equal, or “neu-
tral,” treatment and unequal, or discriminatory, treatment of reli-
gion by the government when distributing benefits and burdens
unites the two sides of the doctrine.
By application of the equal treatment distinction, the Court has
contracted the scope of acts of government assistance that violate
the Establishment Clause. Increasingly, the equal treatment dis-
tinction hinges on a showing that the government acted with a pur-
pose to aid religion akin to the “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in
spite of’” showing required under the Equal Protection
75. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion
(Feb. 1, 2021).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
77. See Fulton v. City of Phila., 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (mem.) (presenting the question
of whether to overrule Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); Am. Legion v. Am. Human-
ist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (abandoning the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971)); Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (iden-
tifying five paradigms of Establishment Clause cases unexplained by Lemon); see also Ho-
sanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (overlapping
both clauses when applying the “ministerial exception”).
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Clause.78 It used to be that the government could violate the anti-
establishment mandate by providing various types of aid to reli-
gious entities, particularly religious schools.79 Now, the apparent
neutrality of the government assistance toward religious and non-
religious entities determines its consistency with the anti-establish-
ment mandate.80 With monetary aid to religious groups, neither
the amount, either absolute or by percentage, or the reality that
some of it will fund religious proselytizing signal unconstitutional-
ity.81 A law may list religious entities specifically as recipients of
largesse, so long as a secular purpose is evident from a list of bene-
ficiaries, which includes more than exclusively religious entities.82
Government use of religious symbols is increasingly permissible so
long as the Court determines that the government does not act with
a purpose to proselytize religion.83
Neutrality guides the Free Exercise Clause inquiry as well, ra-
ther than the weight of the burden on religious practice.84 In Em-
ployment Division v. Smith, the Court articulated this reinterpre-
tation of free exercise doctrine.85 Laws that are neutral on their
face, such as the drug law before it, do not threaten the principle of
religious liberty contained within the clause, and so do not raise the
78. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993)
(describing the methodology for finding discriminatory purpose under the Free Exercise
Clause, and quoting Justice Harlan, speaking in “the related context of the Establishment
Clause,” to say that “[n]eutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of anal-
ysis”) (alteration in original) (first citing Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (articu-
lating the “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’” standard) and then citing Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
79. E.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (invalidating state salary supplements to teachers of sec-
ular subjects in religious schools).
80. See, e.g., Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. at 2086–87; Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
81. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (upholding vouchers despite ninety-six percent of par-
ticipants being enrolled in private religious schools); Id. at 665 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that the absolute amount of aid provided by the school voucher program paled in
comparison to the billions of dollars of aid that flow from the government to religious organ-
izations through tax exemptions and other programs). Compare Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (find-
ing unconstitutional state salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects in private reli-
gious schools), with Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
82. Walz, 397 U.S. at 666 67 (upholding state tax exemption for “property used exclu-
sively for religious, educational or charitable purposes”). But see Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bull-
ock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating sales tax exemption exclusively for books and periodicals
proselytizing religion).
83. See Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (upholding permanent display of thirty-two-
foot high Latin cross memorializing World War I soldiers); McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky.,
545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
84. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32
(1993); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–80 (1990).
85. 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (distinguishing, rather than overruling, prior cases in which
the Court had held that the Free Exercise Clause “bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action”).
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level of judicial review.86 A showing of purpose to regulate the con-
duct of individuals “only when they are engaged in [it] for religious
reasons,” once again mirroring the Equal Protection Clause show-
ing, is required.87
This distinction initially seemed to contract the scope of applica-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause from prior doctrine under which a
substantial burden on religious practice would raise the level of re-
view.88 Soon after Smith, however, the Court decided Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.89 In that case, the
Court held that a combination of several ordinances enacted by the
City of Hialeah, which outlawed animal sacrifice, violated the free
exercise rights of a Santeria church, which had recently moved into
the area.90 The ordinance, as enacted, prohibited animal “sacrifice,”
but did not specifically mention religion.91 Relying specifically on
the equal protection definition of when a discriminatory purpose
sufficient to lift the level of review exists, the Court examined the
structure of the facially neutral ordinance, and other evidence, and
found a purpose, on the part of the City of Hialeah, “to target animal
sacrifice by Santeria worshippers because of its religious motiva-
tion.”92 In so doing, the Court cautioned against “‘subtle departures
from neutrality,’ . . . and ‘covert suppression of particular religious
beliefs’”93 and expressed a resolve to “survey meticulously the cir-
cumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, re-
ligious gerrymanders.”94
Increasingly, the rule of discriminatory purpose, which had
seemed to contract the scope of the Free Exercise Clause, has be-
come a tool of expansion as the Court locates an official purpose to
target conduct because of its religious motivation in new circum-
stances. With respect to free exercise, it used to be that states could
86. Id. at 886 (rejecting the “private right to ignore generally applicable laws,” which
strict scrutiny based on only a substantial burden on religious practice would create, as “a
constitutional anomaly”).
87. Id. at 877–78.
88. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeal Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Vernor, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
89. 508 U.S. 520.
90. Id. at 547.
91. Id. at 527.
92. Id. at 542; see id. at 540 (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979))
(“That the ordinances were enacted ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ their suppression of
Santeria religious practice, . . . is revealed by the events preceding their enactment.”) (cita-
tion omitted); see also id. (finding guidance in equal protection cases to conduct the analysis
into whether the city acted with discriminatory purpose and noting Establishment Clause
analysis is a “related context”).
93. Id. at 534 (citation omitted) (first quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452
(1971); and then quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)).
94. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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choose not to include tax dollar payments to promote religious ac-
tivities.95 Now, the Court has changed its interpretation to find the
failure to include religious entities in a general aid program to show
a purpose to discriminate.96 It has found the failure to include reli-
gious schools in generally available aid programs to evidence a pur-
pose to discriminate in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.97
Most recently, the Court has reviewed requests for emergency or-
ders prohibiting application of restrictions imposed by state gover-
nors on religious exercise in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Transmission of the virus at places of worship had proven to be a
significant source of COVID-19 outbreaks.98 The Court initially de-
nied the requests in divided decisions99 and then, in a similarly split
decision, granted a request, finding that a set of New York re-
strictions were not “neutral because they single[d] out houses of
worship for especially harsh treatment.”100 The opinions in these
cases show that four justices—and now the Court, after its compo-
sition has changed—would find a purpose to discriminate sufficient
to invoke strict scrutiny and invalidate a particular restriction of
religious practice based on a lesser evidentiary showing than the
Court requires under the other rights guarantees.
Pandemic restrictions mention the activity of religious worship
explicitly, but they group it with other secular activities. States
explain the groupings as identifying categories of activities that
pose similar risks of transmission of the disease. New York, for ex-
ample, argued that religious gatherings posed a “super-spreader”
potential greater than activities subject to lesser restrictions be-
cause of the distinct conduct that tends to characterize them.101 The
95. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (holding that state refusal to fund a devo-
tional theology instruction did not violate Free Exercise Clause).
96. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (deter-
mining that denial of church’s application for grant to purchase rubber playground surface
violated the Free Exercise Clause).
97. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
98. Kate Conger et al., Churches Were Eager to Reopen. Now They Are Confronting Coro-
navirus Cases., N.Y. TIMES, https://nyti.ms/3iG8GJw (July 10, 2020); Ryan Lizza & Renuka
Rayasam, Pence and the Power of Positive Thinking, POLITICO (June 26, 2020, 7:00 PM),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-nightly-coronavirus-special-edition/2020/06/26
/pence-and-the-power-of-positive-thinking-489656.
99. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (mem.); Calvary
Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) (mem.).
100. Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020) (finding that, apart from
direct evidence of motivation, the restrictions are not “neutral because they single out houses
of worship for especially harsh treatment,” without distinguishing the conduct that occurs in
the houses of worship from the religious motivation).
101. Id.; Opposition to Application for Writ of Injunction at 22, Roman Catholic Diocese v.
Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (No. 20A87) (they “tend to involve large numbers of people from
different households arriving simultaneously; congregating as an audience for an extended
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states’ explanations that their restrictions of places of worship are
based upon the conduct that tends to occur at them, rather than the
religious motivation for it, is at least plausible.102 And a plausible
explanation based in conduct for a disproportionate disadvantage
placed by law on groups that exhibit protected traits103—or for ex-
plicit mention of such groups when receiving the benefit of legisla-
tion104—is all that is required to dispel an inference of an unconsti-
tutional discriminatory purpose under the doctrine of the Equal
Protection and Establishment Clauses, which is supposed to guide
the Free Exercise determination as well. Instead, the justices sec-
ond-guess the explanations for the differences in treatment of ac-
tivities and interpret states’ explicit choices to restrict religious
worship services as a choice to aim at the religious motivation, ra-
ther than worshippers’ conduct. Both of these moves are incon-
sistent with established methodology105 and expand the scope of the
Free Exercise Clause right. It may well be that the inconsistent
labeling signals a change of interpretation of the core meaning of
the free exercise guarantee from freedom from laws targeting con-
duct because of its religious motivation to freedom from laws plac-
ing a substantial burden on religious practice.106 But until the
Court changes the rule explicitly, it is important to recognize the
inconsistency in locating a purpose to discriminate on the basis of a
protected trait across the rights guarantees.
period of time to talk, sing, or chant; and then leaving simultaneously—as well as the possi-
bility that participants will mingle in close proximity throughout. . . . Particularly because
COVID-19 may be spread by infected individuals who are not yet, or may never become,
symptomatic, the aforementioned features combine to generate an unusually high likelihood
that infected persons will be present, that they will expel respiratory droplets and aerosols
in close proximity to others and infect them, and that those newly-infected persons will fur-
ther spread the virus after they disperse and go their separate ways”).
102. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (find-
ing California’s restrictions consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
despite placing restrictions on places of worship, “[s]imilar or more severe restrictions apply
to comparable secular gatherings, . . . [a]nd the Order exempts or treats more leniently only
dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores, banks, and laundromats, in which peo-
ple neither congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods.”).
103. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
104. SeeWalz v. Tax Comm’n., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
105. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1615 (Kavanaugh, J., joined by
Thomas, J., and Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing the state “may not take a looser approach
with, say, supermarkets, restaurants, factories, and offices while imposing stricter require-
ments on places of worship”); Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2604
(2020) (mem.) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief) (describing
Nevada Governor Sisolak’s directive to prevent the spread of COVID as “discriminatory
treatment of houses of worship [and] violat[ing] the First Amendment”).
106. See Fulton v. City of Phila., 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (mem.) (presenting the question
of whether to reconsider Smith).
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II. ANALYZING A RECENT EXPANSION
InNIFLA, the Court held that a requirement, enacted by the Cal-
ifornia Legislature, that licensed medical facilities that provide lim-
ited pregnancy services post a notice informing clients that the
state provides full services, including abortion, unconstitutionally
compelled the facilities, which were primarily religiously affiliated
and ideologically opposed to abortion, to speak.107 This recent ex-
pansion shifts the balance between rights-holders and the authority
of democratically elected bodies to regulate in ways that will con-
tract the abilities of those democratically elected bodies to choose to
provide consumers more information to aid their decision making
in all sorts of contexts where speakers communicate with clients or
potential clients about products or services.108 Additionally, how-
ever, the recent result, and its reasoning, expands the rights of
speakers motivated by religious belief and contracts the ability of
democratically elected governments to implement a different policy
choice as to the appropriate balance of power between speaker and
listener, one crafted specifically, in the case before the Court, to pro-
tect women’s rights. The overlap of free speech, religious liberty,
and women’s rights provides an opportunity to identify the strands
of each in the decision, and to examine how they do, and should or
should not, intersect. The Court identified and changed key dis-
tinctions in doctrine and also suggested strongly that the evidence
was sufficient to show a government purpose to discriminate
against the speakers because of their viewpoints. The opinion thus
provides a vehicle to analyze the consistency of its methodology for
identifying and changing key distinctions in doctrine and its evalu-
ation of evidence sufficient to show a purpose to discriminate with
the methodologies applied to make similar determinations regard-
ing other constitutional rights, and to identify the possible creep of
priority protection for religiously motivated conduct, which charac-
terizes the free exercise right, into the interpretation of the scope of
the free speech guarantee.
A. National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra109
Crisis pregnancy centers, or, according to more recent terminol-
ogy, pregnancy centers, exist as part of the overall anti-abortion
107. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (invalidating a notice provision applied to unlicensed facilities
as well).
108. See McNamara & Sherman, supra note 9, at 197 (noting that the NIFLA decision
“significantly expand[s] protection for speech in the commercial marketplace”).
109. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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movement.110 They came into being as states began to decriminal-
ize abortion, and the Court interpreted the constitutional right to
choose abortion in Roe v. Wade.111 Up to 4,000 currently operate
across the United States, mostly under the auspices of several
large, faith-based organizations, which provide advice and financial
support.112 The National Institute for Family and Life Advocates
(NIFLA), the lead plaintiff in the lawsuit, is one such umbrella or-
ganization.113 The centers actively advertise to attract women ex-
periencing an unplanned pregnancy and at risk of choosing abor-
tion, and often locate near clinics that provide abortions.114 Their
avowed purpose is to persuade these women to choose childbirth.
They do so by offering free counseling, products, and services to sup-
port the choice.115 Initially mostly unlicensed, the centers are in-
creasingly acquiring licenses to operate as medical facilities, which
gives them access to government funding and allows them to
110. See Olivia Aveni Briscoe, Pregnancy Centers in Virginia and Nationwide Deserve
Recognition, Respect, NAT’L INST. FAM. & LIFE ADVOCS., https://nifla.org/pregnancy-centers-
in-virginia-and-nationwide-deserve-recognition-respect/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2021) (“The
pregnancy center community is one of the most essential aspects of the pro-life movement in
our society today.”).
111. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Vitoria Lin & Cynthia Dailard, Crisis Pregnancy Centers




113. NIFLA, https://nifla.org/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2021) (“Founded in 1993, the National
Institute of Family and Life Advocates provides pro-life pregnancy centers and medical clin-
ics with legal counsel, education, and training. While supplying legal support needed to pro-
tect the work of these life-affirming centers and better equipping them to serve in their com-
munities, NIFLA continues to grow and now represents more than 1,500 member centers
across the country.”).
114. See Pam Belluck, Pregnancy Centers Gain Influence in Anti-Abortion Area, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2013), https://nyti.ms/X7ppVE (“As [pregnancy centers] expand, they are add-
ing on-call or on-site medical personnel and employing sophisticated strategies to attract
women, including Internet search optimization and mobile units near Planned Parenthood
clinics.”); Joanne D. Rosen, The Public Health Risk of Crisis Pregnancy Centers,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 10, 2012), https://www.guttmacher.org/journals/psrh/2012/09/pub-
lic-health-risks-crisis-pregnancy-centers (“Many [pregnancy centers] advertise their services
on their Web sites, in high school and college newspapers, on buses and subways, and on
billboards.”).
115. See Belluck, supra note 114 (“With free pregnancy tests and ultrasounds, along with
diapers, parenting classes and even temporary housing, pregnancy centers are playing an
increasingly influential role in the anti-abortion movement.”); Briscoe, supra note 110 (“Preg-
nancy centers provide women and their families with medical exams and ultrasounds, pre-
natal care, STI testing and treatment, fertility awareness methods, caring consultation, par-
enting education programs, material assistance to families, after-abortion support and re-
covery, and more.”); Margaret H. Hartshorn, The History of Pregnancy Help Centers in the
United States, HEARTBEAT INT’L (Mar. 13, 2007), https://www.heartbeatinternational.org/
pdf/History_of_Centers.pdf (“Approximately [two] million Americans are served yearly, by
professional staff and thousands of trained volunteers, providing confidential medical ser-
vices, education, material aid, and a wide variety of care and support services, all at no cost
to clients.”).
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provide services such as medical exams and ultrasounds.116 Many
different types of licensed medical professionals may staff the cen-
ters.117 The centers, and those who support their activities, cite the
one-on-one counseling, and the free ultrasounds they provide, as
critical and effective tools to persuade women to choose child-
birth.118
Abortion choice supporters have always criticized some of the ac-
tivities of pregnancy centers as providing incomplete, inaccurate, or
misleading information and counseling about risks and options to
the women who seek their services, who are in “crisis” because of
an unexpected pregnancy and who are “disproportionately young,
poorly educated or poor.”119 The California Reproductive Freedom,
Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT
Act)120 stemmed from these types of concerns. An Assembly com-
mittee received evidence that the “nearly 200 licensed and unli-
censed clinics known as crisis pregnancy centers” operating in the
state were “disseminating medically inaccurate information about
[available] pregnancy options . . . .”121 According to the bill analysis,
the pregnancy centers “present themselves as comprehensive repro-
ductive health centers, but are commonly affiliated with, or run by
organizations whose stated goal is to prevent women from accessing
abortions.”122 These centers, the bill analysis continued, employ
“intentionally deceptive advertising and counseling practices [that]
often confuse, misinform, and even intimidate women from making
116. About NIFLA, NAT’L INST. FAM. & LIFE ADVOCS., https://nifla.org/about-nifla/ (last
visited Jan. 2, 2021) (describing “two key programs to support compliance and conversion for
pregnancy centers [to licensed medical facilities]”).
117. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 2016) (listing
the staff of Pregnancy Care Clinic, the licensed pregnancy center plaintiff in the case, as
including “two doctors of obstetrics and gynecology, one radiologist, one anesthesiologist, one
certified midwife, one nurse practitioner, ten nurses, and two registered diagnostic medical
sonographers”).
118. See Belluck, supra note 114 (quoting Jeanneane Maxon, vice president for external
affairs at Americans United for Life, an anti-abortion group, who describes the centers’
“ground level, one-on-one, reaching-the-woman-where-she’s-at approach”); About NIFLA, su-
pra note 116 (“NIFLA recognized the importance of using ultrasound in a pregnancy center
setting for reaching abortion-minded women more than two decades ago, and has been pio-
neering the way in which the pro-life movement uses this important tool ever since. Ultra-
sound offers a window to the womb, and this impacts a woman’s decision to choose life . . . .”).
119. Rosen, supra note 114; see Belluck, supra note 114 (quoting Jean Schroedel, a
Claremont Graduate University politics professor, to say that “there are some positive as-
pects” to centers, but that “things pregnant women are told at many of these centers, some
of it is really factually suspect”); see also Amy. G. Bryant & Jonas J. Swartz, Why Crisis
Pregnancy Centers Are Legal but Unethical, AMA J. ETHICS (Mar. 2018), https://journalofeth-
ics.ama-assn.org/article/why-crisis-pregnancy-centers-are-legal-unethical/2018-03.
120. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE §§ 123470–123473.
121. Joint Appendix at 84, 86, Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct.
2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140).
122. Id. at 85.
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fully-informed, time-sensitive decisions about critical health
care.”123
Although the activities of pregnancy centers prompted legislative
research and action, the FACT Act defined the class of regulated
facilities more broadly.124 The FACT Act’s purpose, according to the
bill’s author, was “to provide reproductive health assistance to low
income women” and, more specifically, “because pregnancy deci-
sions are time sensitive,” to ensure that “California women . . . re-
ceive information about their rights and available services at the
sites where they obtain care.”125 The Act required all licensed cov-
ered facilities126 to disseminate127 a notice stating, “California has
public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to
comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-
approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for
eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the
county social services office at [insert the telephone number].”128
123. Id.
124. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123470–123473; Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs.
v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d & remanded by 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)
(“[T]he Legislature found that the most effective way to ensure that women are able to receive
access to family planning services, and accurate information about such services, was to re-
quire licensed pregnancy-related clinics unable to enroll patients in state-sponsored pro-
grams to state the existence of these services. Assem. Bill No. 775 § 1(c)–(d).”); Joint Appen-
dix, supra note 121, at 86 (“Because approaches that have treated CPCs and full-service
pregnancy centers differently have been challenged as violating the First Amendment, the
report concludes that the best approach to a statutory change would regulate all pregnancy
centers, not just CPCs, in a uniform manner, which is the approach that this bill adopts.”).
125. Joint Appendix, supra note 121, at 84.
126. The FACT Act defines a licensed covered facility as “a facility licensed under Section
1204 or an intermittent clinic operating under a primary care clinic pursuant to subdivision
(h) of Section 1206, whose primary purpose is providing family planning or pregnancy-related
services,” and that also satisfies two or more of the following criteria:
(1) The facility offers obstetric ultrasounds, obstetric sonograms, or prenatal care to
pregnant women. (2) The facility provides, or offers counseling about, contraception
or contraceptive methods. (3) The facility offers pregnancy testing or pregnancy diag-
nosis. (4) The facility advertises or solicits patrons with offers to provide prenatal so-
nography, pregnancy tests, or pregnancy options counseling. (5) The facility offers
abortion services. (6) The facility has staff or volunteers who collect health information
from clients.
CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 123471.
127. The FACT Act requires that the Licensed Notice be disclosed by licensed facilities in
one of three possible manners:
(A) A public notice posted in a conspicuous place where individuals wait that may be
easily read by those seeking services from the facility. The notice shall be at least 8.5
inches by 11 inches and written in no less than 22-point type. (B) A printed notice
distributed to all clients in no less than 14-point type. (C) A digital notice distributed
to all clients that can be read at the time of check-in or arrival, in the same point type
as other digital disclosures.
Id. § 123472(a)(2).
128. Id. § 123472(a)(1).
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Prior to the effective date of the FACT Act, NIFLA and other or-
ganizations filed a lawsuit arguing that its notice provisions129 vio-
lated their federal constitutional free speech rights by compelling
them to speak a government message contrary to their beliefs.130
The Court accepted review of the case at the preliminary injunction
stage and reversed the decision of the court of appeals which, like
the district court, had found the regulated entities to have no like-
lihood of success under established precedent.131
With respect to the licensed center notice, the court of appeals
had addressed both the general question of where to place the cir-
cumstances presented by the case within existing free speech doc-
trine, to determine the level of review and analysis, and the specific
question whether the circumstances of the FACT Act, neutral on its
face, revealed a purpose by the California Legislature to discrimi-
nate against the pregnancy centers because of their viewpoints,
which would provoke strict scrutiny review. The court first found
no purpose to discriminate against the pregnancy centers’ view-
point.132 In so doing, it reviewed the classification of centers subject
to the notice requirement and found the exemption of facilities en-
rolled in state programs to be sufficiently explained by the fact that
they “already provide all of the publicly-funded health services out-
lined in the [notice].”133 The court next addressed the doctrinal
question of what level of scrutiny should apply to the circumstances
of the notice imposed on licensed pregnancy centers, and on the li-
censed medical professional within them, presented by the case.
Although it acknowledged that the notice requirement was content-
based, it considered the exceptions to the general rule that content-
based regulations of speech provoke strict scrutiny. It quickly re-
jected application of the Zauderer exception134 but found the notice
requirement analogous to the one imposed on abortion providers
129. In addition to the licensed center notice, the FACT Act requires unlicensed clinics to
post a notice informing clients that they were unlicensed. Id. § 123472(b). The licensed
center notice is the focus of this article.
130. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016).
131. Id. at 845.
132. Id. at 835 (“The Act . . . does not discriminate based on viewpoint. It does not dis-
criminate based on the particular opinion, point of view, or ideology of a certain speaker.
Instead, the Act applies to all licensed and unlicensed facilities, regardless of what, if any,
objections they may have to certain family-planning services.”).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 834 n.5 (“We find unpersuasive Appellees’ argument that the Act regulates
commercial speech subject to rational basis review. . . . Commercial speech ‘does no more
than propose a commercial transaction.’ . . . The Act primarily regulates the speech that
occurs within the clinic, and thus is not commercial speech.”) (citations omitted) (citing Zau-
derer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985), then quoting Coyote Publ’g,
Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 604 (9th Cir. 2010)).
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upheld by the Court in Casey.135 It noted a split among the circuits
as to whether the Casey plurality had identified a level of review for
regulations of medical professional client counseling of the same
type, and concluded that, in its brief statements, it had not. Apply-
ing circuit precedent, the court of appeals reasoned that “the level
of protection to apply to specific instances of professional speech or
conduct is best understood as along a continuum.”136 On one end of
the continuum, when a professional engages in “public dialogue,”
the context of the speech is “constitutionally equivalent to soapbox
orators and pamphleteers, and their speech receives robust protec-
tion,” implemented by strict scrutiny review of government actions
that alter the content of the speech.137 On the other end of the con-
tinuum, “lies professional conduct, where the speech at issue is, for
example, a form of treatment.”138 When regulating conduct, “the
state’s power is great, even though such regulation may have an
incidental effect on speech,” so content-based actions imposed on
professional conduct, which occurs by means of speech, are subject
to rational basis scrutiny.139 Professional client counseling exists
at the midpoint, where:
“the First Amendment tolerates a substantial amount of
speech regulation within the professional-client relationship
that it would not tolerate outside of it” because “[w]hen profes-
sionals, by means of their state-issued licenses, form relation-
ships with clients, the purpose of those relationships is to ad-
vance the welfare of the clients, rather than to contribute to
public debate.”140
At this midpoint, the court determined that an intermediate level
of review best balanced the speech rights professional speakers re-
tain, when counseling clients, and the enhanced authority of the
state to regulate their speech to protect the interests of their client
listeners.141
135. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371–75 (2018); see
also id. at 2372 (rejecting application of the disclosure standard established in Zauderer, 471
U.S. 626, on the ground that pregnancy facility speech is not commercial speech).
136. Harris, 839 F.3d at 839; see Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–29 (9th Cir. 2014),
overruled in part by Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361; see also King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216,
232 (3d Cir. 2014); Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 568–70 (4th Cir. 2013).
137. Harris, 839 F.3d at 839.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 839 (quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229).
140. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228).
141. At the mid-point, the court found applying intermediate scrutiny is consistent with
the principle that “within the confines of a professional relationship, First Amendment pro-
tection of a professional’s speech is somewhat diminished,” Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228, but that
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The court found the California notice to apply to professional
speech at this midpoint. The distinction among speech between a
professional and a client and other types of speech, it explained,
stems from the belief that professionals, “through their educa-
tion and training, have access to a corpus of specialized
knowledge that their clients usually do not” and that clients
put “their health or their livelihood in the hands of those who
utilize knowledge and methods with which [they] ordinarily
have little or no familiarity.”142
“There is no question,” according to the court, “that [pregnancy
center] clients go [there] precisely because of the professional ser-
vices [they] offer[], and that they reasonably rely upon the[m] for
[their] knowledge and skill.”143 The court applied intermediate
scrutiny to the California notice and upheld it.144
The Supreme Court disagreed with the evaluation of the evidence
of a purpose to discriminate against the pregnancy centers on the
basis of their viewpoints and with its doctrinal reasoning. As to
purpose, it noted “serious concerns” that sufficient evidence of view-
point discrimination by the California Legislature was present,
which Justice Kennedy, joined by three other justices from the ma-
jority, echoed in concurrence.145 Rather than rest its decision on
that ground, however, the Court based its finding that the petition-
ers had shown a likelihood of success on the merits on its analysis
of doctrine, and its placement of the notice as outside the exceptions
that would provoke some type of deferential review.146 It rejected
application of the Zauderer exception on multiple grounds, includ-
ing that mention of abortion fails the requirement that the content
of the information the state requires be delivered be “uncontrover-
sial.”147 It rejected application of the Casey exception on the ground
that it applied only to information-delivery requirements imposed
professionals also do not “simply abandon their First Amendment rights when they com-
mence practicing a profession.” Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir. 2014).
142. Harris, 839 F.3d at 839 (alteration in original) (quoting King v. Governor of N.J., 767
F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014).
143. Id. at 840.
144. Id. at 842 (“We conclude that the Licensed Notice is narrowly drawn to achieve Cal-
ifornia’s substantial interests.”).
145. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2370 n.2 (2018); id. at
2378 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146. See id. at 2378–79 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing relief that the Court’s anal-
ysis was not confined to finding a discriminatory purpose in the circumstances of the partic-
ular case before the Court because then “some legislators might have inferred that if the law
were reenacted with a broader base and broader coverage it then would be upheld”).
147. Id. at 2372.
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on medical professionals as part of obtaining informed consent to a
medical procedure.148 It also rejected the court of appeals’ conclu-
sion that a standard other than strict scrutiny should apply to in-
formation-delivery requirements imposed on professional speech.149
Instead, it likened “professional speech” to fully protected public is-
sue speech, which the rule of strict scrutiny of content-based classi-
fications applies.150 Harkening to the principle of an unrestricted
marketplace of ideas, it noted the diverse views that professionals
may have, which lead to “good-faith disagreements” about topics
within their fields and listed instances of dangerous censorship of
speech by medical professionals and by authoritarian governments
in the past as warnings of the consequences of upholding laws, like
the one before it, which “manipulat[e] the content of doctor-patient
discourse . . . .”151
B. The Doctrinal Distinction Between the Circumstances of Client
Counseling
The notice provision imposed on licensed professional client coun-
seling at pregnancy centers queued up a question at the heart of
free speech doctrine. The Court had to classify the novel circum-
stances of the communications at issue in the case within existing
doctrine, which draws a highly significant distinction between com-
munications within the public realm of information and ideas,
which must remain unrestricted by government judgments about
their content,152 and communications instrumental to transactions
among individuals. The Court has always interpreted the Consti-
tution to permit the government to regulate to fulfill its function of
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizenry.153 The
148. Id. at 2373–74.
149. Id. at 2371.
150. Id. at 2375 (finding no “persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique
category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles,” but stating that it did
not “foreclose the possibility that some such reason exists”).
151. Id. at 2374.
152. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting “a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open”).
153. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1652 (2009) (“There are countless ways in which civil liability impli-
cates free speech, such as the torts of defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and the right of publicity. Even tort actions for negligence can be
brought in response to a person’s speech. Numerous contracts restrict speech, such as em-
ployment contracts, settlement arrangements, and confidentiality agreements. Trade secret
law can also restrict speech, as can other forms of intellectual property law. There are nu-
merous restrictions in condos, cooperatives, and apartment buildings about when, where,
and how residents can display signs or otherwise engage in speech.”) (footnotes omitted).
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new circumstances had attributes that could put the communica-
tions on either side of the line. On the one hand, the speakers self-
identify as proselytizing ideology, and particularly a deeply felt ide-
ology commanded by religious doctrine. They also self-identify as
extraordinarily burdened by the requirement that they
acknowledge the existence of the procedure they oppose because
any information, and particularly this most detested information,
injected into advocacy changes its content and disrupts their abili-
ties as speakers to curate the information and opinions they present
to persuade their listeners to agree with them and choose the course
of conduct they recommend. Proselytizing religion is a type of com-
munication that classifies as most highly protected from govern-
ment intervention. On the other hand, the speakers do so in their
roles as licensed medical professionals, providing counseling and
services to individuals clients drawn to listen because of the profes-
sionals’ greater expertise, and performing procedures and using
tools, which they must have a government issued license to deploy.
In these ways, the communications track as instrumental to provid-
ing individualized services, a type of communication which govern-
ments have had longstanding constitutional authority to choose to
regulate to protect the abilities of citizen listeners to make decisions
about their own health, safety, and welfare.
Classifying the circumstances of the pregnancy center notice re-
quired the Court to compare the contexts of the communications
and the form and content of the information-delivery requirements
in doctrine, and their links to implementing free speech principles.
With respect to the context of the communication, the Court did not
classify the full range of professional client counseling as the same
doctrinally, or even the full range of licensed medical professional
counseling of pregnant women about their medical procedure op-
tions. Instead, the Court distinguished the circumstances of client
counseling in pregnancy centers from facilities that provide abor-
tions and, to a lesser extent, the form and content of the notice from
the information-delivery requirements that remain subject to lower
level review. This doctrinal distinction leaves the pregnancy center
communications, curated to influence the clients’ choices, in place
and unsupplemented, and, as is the nature of doctrinal distinctions,
protects communications of the same type from regulation as well.
At the same time, the distinction leaves in place the authority of
states to continue to require doctors performing abortions, and
other procedures important to women’s health, to deliver infor-
mation curated by the state to influence the clients’ choices. Both
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results diminish women’s rights to exercise autonomy in health and
life decision making.
The methodology of changing the doctrinal distinction that ex-
panded the scope of women’s right to equal protection provides a
background against which to examine this harmful combination of
results for consistency. This Part examines each subpart of the
Court’s reasoning—rejecting application of the Zauderer and Casey
exceptions and application of the new exception for professional cli-
ent counseling—in turn.154
1. Zauderer155
The Zauderer exception, understood to apply to commercial
speech, is not the more natural fit of the existing exceptions to the
circumstances of the case. The Court discussed it briefly and dis-
missed its application to the notice requirement at issue onmultiple
grounds.156 All of these will further liberate commercial speakers
from regulation for the purpose of providing more information to
the customers and clients they seek to persuade. One particularly
impacts the authority of states to regulate to protect the rights of
women to receive information important to their decision making.
The content of the notice, according to the Court, failed to meet
the requirement that it be “purely factual and uncontroversial” be-
cause it included mention of the availability of abortion, which is
“anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”157 Situated within the
reasoning of the exception, the requirement that an information-
delivery requirement be “uncontroversial” implements constitu-
tional principle by segregating ideological messages that advocate
opinions imposed on individuals outside the commercial context
from requirements that commercial speakers deliver additional
facts to consumers to enhance their abilities to make informed, per-
sonal choices among products and services.158 Corporate speakers
154. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2379–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (making a number of the
same points as are made in these parts, without a particular focus on women’s rights or
religious liberty and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan).
155. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
156. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651) (noting that the na-
ture of the communication between medical professionals and clients seeking pregnancy-re-
lated counseling and services is different than the “commercial advertising” to clients, or
potential clients, about the speaker’s “terms [of] service,” to which Zauderer’s “lower level of
scrutiny” applies and the content of the notice—”disclos[ing] information about state-spon-
sored services”—”in no way relates to the services that licensed clinics provide”).
157. Id. at 2372.
158. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (distinguishing the government’s action to prescribe ortho-
doxy in commercial advertising from prescribing “what shall be orthodox in politics,
84 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 59
have relied upon it to narrow the Zauderer exception to gain protec-
tion from particular forms of information-delivery requirements,
such as graphic warnings on cigarette packages, which they have
successfully argued send an opinion, rather than only facts.159
The contents of these information-delivery requirements, and the
claims based on them, however, are different from the content of
the California notice and the claims that may be based upon it. The
content of the California notice delivered a fact about abortion—it
is a service supported by resources available from the state. Per-
haps even more significantly, the contents of the California notice
were the same as the Casey information-delivery requirement,
which required doctors to deliver factual information about child-
birth and which the Court reaffirmed as consistent with the free
speech guarantee.160
The Court’s quick conclusion that mere mention of abortion is
controversial, and thereby expands the right of speakers to avoid
government regulations that include it, requires examination be-
cause it suggests a slip of ideological preference into the definition
of the scope of the free speech right. The Court seems to say that
mention of the fact of the availability of abortion is controversial,
and akin to opinion advocacy, because in the public realm its appro-
priateness remains hotly contested or perhaps because the speakers
upon whom the information-delivery requirement is imposed disa-
gree strongly with the decisions that have made it a legal option,
and so experience the imposition of the information-delivery re-
quirement in this way. In their strong objections—based on com-
mands they understand to come from an authority greater than
themselves and superior to the state—the pregnancy center
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion”) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
159. Ellen P. Goodman, Corporate First Amendment Grab: Three Trends and a Data Ap-
plication, MEDIUM (May 29, 2016), https://ellgood.medium.com/corporate-first-amendment-
grab-three-trends-and-a-data-application-5046103e6628 (“With varying degrees of success,
groups like the Washington Legal Foundation and Cato Institute have challenged country-
of-origin labels, mercury disposal labels, graphic tobacco warnings, calorie disclosures, air-
line tax disclosures, obesity warnings for sugary sodas, and product sourcing disclosures.
They argue that these government-mandated disclosure regimes mask ideological agendas,
and that the information that must be disclosed is either not purely factual or tendentious,
or both.”).
160. The Casey plurality’s brief discussion did not explicitly require that the information
the state required doctors to deliver be uncontroversial. It emphasized, however, that it
should be “truthful, nonmisleading information,” which presumably implements the same
constitutional principle. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
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speakers resemble the speakers whose claims generated compelled
speech doctrine.161 But there the resemblance ends.
The controversial nature of the topic of abortion in public discus-
sion or the perception of particular speakers that the mere mention
of the procedure is opinion advocacy, however strongly held, cannot
change the constitutional significance of the words the state re-
quires them to disseminate. The availability of abortion is a fact,
because the decisions to make the procedure legal and available
have beenmade bymeans of judicial interpretation and through the
democratic process. The legality of abortion and the availability of
resources to support it are facts in California, just like the legality
of childbirth and the availability of resources to support it were
facts in Pennsylvania.162 Distinguishing between the two circum-
stances, on the ground that one presents controversial opinion and
the other does not, does not link to implementing free speech prin-
ciples.
With the link from application to principle stripped away, the
possibility arises that the circumstances of the case influenced this
identification of a distinction in the doctrine, which will reverberate
far beyond them. Specifically, the possibility arises that the ideol-
ogy of the speakers, upon whom the information-delivery require-
ment was imposed, influenced the determination of which content
is controversial within the meaning of the free speech guarantee,
and which is not. And here, that ideology stems from sincere and
strongly held religious beliefs. In this way, and according to this
close examination, the Court’s conclusion that the mere mention of
abortion imposed on religiously motivated medical professionals—
but not childbirth imposed on those acting according to a secular
ideology—is “controversial” and tips the constitutional balance and
risks incorporating the religious motivation of medical profession-
als when counseling clients into the definition of the scope of the
free speech right. This potential for priority protection for reli-
giously motivated speakers, to avoid disclosing a fact they deem
controversial, would reach beyond medical professionals, to the full
range of product and service providers subject to the Zauderer ex-
ception. Women need products and services to exercise their rights,
and they need facts about those products and services to make
161. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (prohibiting state government from re-
quiring a Jehovah’s Witness to use his vehicle license plates to display the state motto “Live
Free or Die,” which he found repugnant to his religious beliefs); Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (pre-
venting enforcement of a regulation forcing Jehovah’s Witnesses to salute the American flag
in schools, which would violate the religion’s command to “not bow down thyself . . . nor serve”
any “graven image”).
162. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55.
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informed decisions about how to exercise them. Recognizing and
challenging the creep of religious belief into the definition of the
constitutional right against compelled speech is crucial to protect-
ing the authority of democratically elected bodies to regulate to pro-
tect women’s rights.
2. Casey163
The nature of the professional-client counseling communication
and the content of the information-delivery requirement in Casey
looked much like the nature of the communication and the content
of the notice requirement in NIFLA. In both, licensed medical pro-
fessionals counseled individual pregnant clients about their health
care options in circumstances where a choice to undergo a medical
procedure must be made and provided services, including medical
procedures, to implement and support the clients’ choices. The in-
formation-delivery requirements, to which the professional speak-
ers objected, listed resources available from the state to support the
client’s choice of medical procedures that the facility did not pro-
vide. The NIFLA Court nevertheless distinguished the nature of
the communications by describing the Casey requirement as a “reg-
ulation of professional conduct that incidentally burden[ed] speech”
whereas the California licensed facility notice regulated “speech as
speech.”164 According to the Court, the Casey requirement was “in-
cidental” because it regulated speech “only as part of the practice of
medicine,” mandating that a medical professional provide a patient
“certain specific information” as part of the traditional process of
obtaining consent to perform a medical procedure.165 By contrast,
the California notice by form and content did not fit the model of
informed consent “firmly entrenched” in American law because it
was not “tied to a procedure” and did not, in addition to listing state
resources supporting alternate choices, provide information about
the risks and benefits of the procedures the facilities provide.166 The
Court noted as well, in summary, that it “d[id] not question the le-
gality of health and safety warnings long considered permissi-
ble,”167 which presumably in form and content extend beyond the
163. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
164. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373–74 (2018).
165. Id. at 2373.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2376.
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narrow confines of informed consent to a procedure a medical pro-
fessional proposes to provide.168
The Court did not directly link its fine distinctions between the
types of licensing medical professional client counseling communi-
cations or the content of the information-delivery requirements to
free speech principles.169 This link would explain why speech pre-
ceding a procedure that the medical professional proposes to per-
form defines the outer boundary of the state’s authority to regulate
professional speech to serve client listeners’ interests in full infor-
mation to aid their decision making. In fact, in its discussion of
Casey and its application, the Court focused exclusively on the com-
parative proximity of medical professional speakers to performing
procedures and did not identify, or differentiate according to their
constitutional significance, the interests of the client listeners in re-
ceiving complete information about medical care alternatives at all.
Instead, the difference it spotted, and repeatedly emphasized, is
that the nature of the communication and the form and content of
the Casey requirement is consistent with “[l]ongstanding,” “tradi-
tional,” and “firmly entrenched” understandings of the scope of gov-
ernment regulation of the interactions between medical profession-
als and clients.170 The California requirement, however, imposed
on a facility as a notice posted to all its clients advising them of
resources relevant to them all because of their shared health condi-
tion, to the Court, seems new.171
The lesson of the evolution of the doctrine of women’s rights is
that traditional understandings of what the Constitution’s broad
principles mean, in application to particular practices, do not legit-
imize current interpretations of these applications, when the cir-
cumstances of regulation and the exercise of the rights have
changed. The California notice requirement addresses the new cir-
cumstance of facilities using their state-licensed status to draw low-
income clients in with promises of client-centered counseling. This
advice is offered for free and of the type traditionally offered by
medical professionals, but may often be decidedly untraditional be-
cause the medical professional’s counseling and advice may priori-
tize an ideology that dictates choices according to an overriding di-
vine mandate, rather than for reasons that relate to the risks and
168. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16–18, Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140) (ar-
guing that protecting NIFLA’s rights would not undermine routine disclosure requirements).
169. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that the distinction
“lacks moral, practical, and legal force”).
170. Id. at 2372–73.
171. Id. at 2373–74.
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benefits of alternate choices based on the client’s particular physi-
cal, social, and economic circumstances.172 Nothing in the distinc-
tion between old and new circumstances of providing medical coun-
seling and services to pregnant clients explains why the balance be-
tween speakers’ rights and the authority of the state to regulate to
provide full information to aid client decision making differs in the
two circumstances. In fact, the way many abortions occur has
changed. A third of early abortions do not occur by means of a med-
ical procedure,173 a reality that the Court seems not to have recog-
nized when relying on traditional practices to ground its result. So,
what was old is now new. Medical technology has outpaced the
precedent that interprets its constitutional significance, at least as
described by the Court.
Once again, with a grounding in principle removed, the distinc-
tion between the essentially similar circumstances of medical pro-
fessional counseling suggests a preference among speakers, because
of what they say or, perhaps, why they say it.174 The preference
appears even more vivid when viewed in combination with the
states’ retained constitutional authority to require doctors who per-
form abortions to deliver information outside the traditional in-
formed consent boundaries of the “risks or benefits of th[e] proce-
dure[]” and intentionally crafted to persuade women to make a per-
sonal health care choice to serve public priorities.175 The apparent
preference critically defines the scope of the free speech right, leav-
ing in place the authority of states to continue to impose ever more
burdensome speech requirements on abortion providers when coun-
seling clients while carving from the state’s reach medical profes-
sionals’ client counseling motivated by the anti-abortion viewpoint
which, by emphasis by the Court, aligns quite precisely with reli-
giously motivated speech.176 It could be that the Constitution per-
mits neither the California nor the Pennsylvania types of regulation
of the client counseling speech by licensed medical professionals.
But the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose conclusion of the Court cannot be
explained by reference to implementing constitutional principles.
Like the Zauderer “controversial” distinction, it raises the possibil-
ity that particular circumstances of the speakers, the cause to
172. Bryant & Swartz, supra note 119.
173. The Availability and Use of Medication Abortion, KAISERFAM. FOUND. (June 8, 2020),
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/the-availability-and-use-of-medication-
abortion/.
174. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2388 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting the same possibil-
ities).
175. See id. at 2373–74.
176. Id. at 2368.
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which they are “devoted,” and perhaps the religious belief that mo-
tivates the devotion, have crept into the doctrine that defines the
scope of the free speech right.
3. Professional Speech
After distinguishing the circumstances of the California covered
facility notice from those that fall within exceptions to the rigorous
review that applies to content-based speech regulations, theNIFLA
Court rejected the court of appeals’ determination that mid-level
review best implements constitutional principles in the circum-
stances of the California notice imposed on the medical professional
speech to clients that occurs in pregnancy centers.177 In so doing, it
failed to reference the court of appeals’ “continuum” of types of pro-
fessional speech, specifically its determination that client counsel-
ing differs from public advocacy in a way that should change the
constitutional balance between speakers’ rights and states’ rights
to supplement the information available to the client listeners. In-
stead, it frames the issue as whether it should treat the entire cat-
egory of “professional speech” as “a unique category that is exempt
from ordinary First Amendment principles.”178 Not surprisingly,
the Court found that it should not.
Addressing the broad range of “professional speech,” the Court
linked full protection for it to fulfilling core constitutional princi-
ples. First, professional speech conveys valuable ideas and infor-
mation. The Court has “long protected” the free speech rights of
professionals in diverse contexts.179 It has “stressed” that such pro-
tection is particularly important “in the fields of medicine and pub-
lic health, where information can save lives.”180 Second, content-
based regulation of professional speech threatens harmful censor-
ship by the government of “unpopular ideas or information” in the
guise of fulfilling “legitimate regulatory goal[s].”181 With respect to
medicine specifically, doctors’ “candor is crucial” to “help patients
make deeply personal decisions . . . .”182 Throughout history, gov-
ernments have “‘manipulat[ed] the content of doctor-patient dis-
course’ to increase state power and suppress minorities . . . .”183
177. Id. at 2375 (finding no “persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique
category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles”).
178. Id.




183. Id. (alteration in original).
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Specifically, the Nazi regime “violated the separation between state
ideology and medical discourse” by teaching German doctors that
“they owed a higher duty to the ‘health of the Volk’ than to the
health of individual patients.”184 Third, regulation of professional
speech threatens the emergence of truth through competition in an
“uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”185 Professionals “have a host of
good-faith disagreements, both with each other and with the gov-
ernment, on many topics in their respective fields.”186 The people,
as marketplace participants, must choose what is true from
amongst the wide variety of information and opinions that profes-
sionals may offer, rather than the government deciding which ideas
should prevail.187 Finally, the category of “professional speech” is a
“difficult category to define with precision” and could extend to
cover “a wide array of individuals.”188 This broad definition would
give states “a powerful tool to impose ‘invidious discrimination of
disfavored subjects’” by requiring that individuals acquire a license
to operate.189
The reach of the Court’s reasoning is vast. Its application to the
particular circumstance of pregnancy center speech to clients adds
more weight to the conclusion that a speaker’s religious motivation
has now entered into free speech doctrine to define the scope of the
right. The abortion advocacy activities that receive the highest pro-
tection from government regulation occur in all venues of public
communication—media, internet, streets, outside government
buildings—and in all stages of the political process. Within the ge-
ographic vicinity of medical facilities that offer abortions, the
speech occurs as abortion protests outside, sidewalk counseling of
individual clients as they enter, and marketing campaigns geo-
fenced to target women in the waiting rooms.190 This speech can be
graphic, accusatory, tailored to persuade the listeners to the ideo-
logical position, and can present information curated to persuade
without disclosing that it is not accepted by medical
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2374–75.
187. Id. at 2375.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2366 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423
n.19 (1993)).
190. All About Geofencing, CHOOSE LIFE MKTG. (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.chooselife-
marketing.com/all-about-geofencing/ (describing how the geofencing “advertising tactic” al-
lows a pregnancy center to set up a “virtual fence” around “[an] abortion clinic down the
street from their office” so that “[w]henever an [sic] abortion clinic clients walk into that zone,
they can be shown ads [on their phones] that give information about the pregnancy center’s
free ultrasounds and pregnancy tests”).
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professionals.191 Prioritizing speaker autonomy in these contexts
fulfills free speech principles more generally because listeners re-
ceive access to everything, so that they may listen, evaluate, and
participate as equals in the discussion and debate. All participants
in the public exchange of ideas understand that the other speakers
are speaking from their own experience, according to their own per-
spectives, and quite likely curating the information and advice they
present to persuade listeners to engage in conduct that fulfills the
speaker’s interests, without respect to the different circumstances
and interests of the listener.
The Court reasons that the Constitution grants medical profes-
sionals counseling clients in pregnancy centers the same scope of
discretion to use their tools, and craft their speech, to fulfill their
own persuasive objectives as public advocates possess when argu-
ing opinions more generally. The Court seems to say that all indi-
viduals offering personalized services, whether operating under a
state license or not, possess this broad right to curate their speech
to clients to persuade them to a choice, which may implement an
ideological mandate outside the particular circumstances of the cli-
ent. But this cannot be correct. By law, many types of professionals
must offer advice crafted to serve the best interests of the client and
must avoid conflicts of interest that would influence their advice.192
Suppose a number of “bankers,” “accountants,” or well-funded in-
vestment advisors were committed to the belief that making high-
return investments is the best way to lift low-income individuals
out of poverty. Could they advertise free advice and counseling, set
up pop-up clinics in the neighborhoods where their target clientele
reside, provide information and advice curated to persuade them to
acquire high-risk investments, and resources to support their deci-
sions to do so? Could they provide tablets, Internet access, website
addresses for making investments and trades, and remain
191. See Diana Pearl, Free Speech Outside the Abortion Clinic, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 19,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/03/free-speech-outside-the-abortion-
clinic/388162/ (describing the experience of one woman who after arrival at an abortion clinic
was surrounded by a “group of 12 wield[ing] signs covered in photos of aborted fetuses with
the word ‘murder’ printed across them in big block letters”); see also Dennis Carter, The
COVID-19 Crisis Hasn’t Stopped Abortion Protests. Now, Clinics Need Backup., REWIRE
NEWS GRP. (Apr. 15, 2020, 4:21 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2020/04/15/the-covid-19-cri-
sis-hasnt-stopped-abortion-protests-now-clinics-need-backup/.
192. For example, “Regulation Best Interest (BI) is a 2019 Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) rule requiring broker-dealers to only recommend financial products to their
customers that are in their customers’ best interests, and to clearly identify any potential
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constitutionally immune from a state mandate that these clinics
post a notice stating that information about the risk of various types
of investments is available on the Internet, and providing links to
several websites? Does the Court really mean that lawyers, who
deem prenuptial agreements imprudent, may advertise free pre-
marriage counseling to individual clients, and in those conversa-
tions, selectively omit the option and otherwise craft the infor-
mation and expert advice presented to persuade all clients to that
choice, and escape discipline?193
It could be that the Court really intends to sweep away almost all
of the government’s traditional authority to license professionals
and regulate, under the auspices of the license, the activities of the
professionals that take the form of speech. But this seems unlikely.
And if the Court does not intend to interpret the Constitution to
protect all instances of licensed professional client counseling, of-
fered free, and out of strong and sincere ideological motivation, from
information-delivery requirement regulation, then the question
arises: What distinction rooted in constitutional principle explains
why some instances, but not others, receive preference? Once
again, the Court’s doctrinal reasoning raises the possibility that
concerns specific to the content of the notice at issue and the impact
on the particular professional speakers played a role in the inter-
pretation.
The Court’s descriptions of the link to free speech principles ex-
ude an undertone of a threat to religious liberty. The references to
government efforts to “suppress unpopular ideas” under the guise
of valid public purposes and the use of state power to “suppress mi-
norities” and “invidious[ly] discriminat[e against] disfavored sub-
jects”194mirror the Court’s increasing vigilance to root out by means
of application of the free exercise guarantee, “subtle departures
from neutrality” and “covert suppression of particular religious be-
liefs.”195 Then, a new move seems to happen when the Court im-
ports the goal of preserving an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
into the licensed professional client counseling relationship, which
includes all the many perspectives that may result in “good faith
disagreements” among professionals. Applied to the situation of
pregnancy centers before it, achieving this goal means leaving the
193. Cf. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374–75 (offering, among the types of “good-faith disagree-
ments” among professionals, the examples of “bankers and accountants” who “might disagree
about the amount of money that should be devoted to savings,” and “lawyers and marriage
counselors [who] might disagree about the prudence of prenuptial agreements”).
194. Id.
195. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
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licensed professional client conversations within them unregulated
by the state. The perspective that escapes regulation is that no cli-
ent should choose abortion and, behind that, the “good faith” and
“fair minded” perspective196 that a command superior to the client’s
personal circumstances should guide the licensed professional’s ad-
vice. The Court’s comments that the “candor” of medical profession-
als in client counseling is crucial and that substitution by medical
professionals of a “higher duty” for concern for “the health of indi-
vidual patients” presents a great danger to them are interesting, in
light of its holding that states must allow medical professionals to
omit relevant treatment options for the purpose of persuading pa-
tients to conform their health decisions to a higher command.197
While the Court is highly concerned about professional speakers
manipulating client decision making in the former situation, when
driven to do so by state mandate, it simply does not perceive a prob-
lem in the latter, in which its interpretation forbids the state to in-
tervene in any way. At least in application to the case before it, the
distinction the Court draws precludes the state from choosing to
protect health care consumers by counteracting gaps in information
about options imposed by the overlay of religious belief onto the
practice of medicine.
The link to constitutional principle that the Court articulates,
merging all instances of “professional speech” that reflect religious
perspectives, particularly endangers the ability of women to main-
tain and expand democratically enacted rights to support their au-
tonomous decision making in the specific circumstances of client
counseling. Governments must treat religious perspectives equally
with all others when it regulates publicly directed speech.198 The
Court’s holding extends this equal treatment rule into the client
counseling relationship, based on an implicit determination that
the balance between speaker and listener interests in the two con-
texts are the same. But the Court never addresses the circum-
stances of pregnancy center clients, or the state’s claim that their
medical condition, and economic circumstances, make them partic-
ularly in need of assistance in receiving full information about their
options, rather than having to fend, in the marketplace of licensed
196. Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 657 (2015) (acknowledging that the view of
marriage as “a gender-differentiated union of man and woman . . . has been held—and con-
tinues to be held—in good faith by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the
world”); id. at 692, 712 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“These apparent assaults on the character
of fair-minded people will have an effect, in society and in court.”).
197. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374 (quoting Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848 F.3d 1293, 1328
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (W. Pryor, J., concurring)).
198. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995).
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professional opinions, for themselves. Transposing the rule of equal
treatment from the realm of publicly directed speech into the cir-
cumstances of licensed medical professionals’ counseling means
that states may not choose to ensure a base level of client focus in
the licensed professional-client relationship, in the form of infor-
mation to aid the nonexpert listeners, who depend upon the expert
advice to make their own “deeply personal decisions,” which impact
the fulfillment and direction of their lives.199 More explanation of
why constitutional principle commands this balance between indi-
vidual right and government authority to regulate in the specific
and limited context of individualized client counseling by licensed
professionals is required to dispel the inference that religious moti-
vations of the speakers has entered into defining the scope of the
free speech right.
C. Purpose
Although the NIFLA Court does not hinge its decision on a find-
ing that the California Legislature acted with discriminatory pur-
pose when it enacted the notice requirements, it notes, at the begin-
ning of its opinion, that it had “serious concerns” that it did so.200
Hints, tentative conclusions, and historical examples of govern-
ments “manipulat[ing]” speech “to increase state power and sup-
press minorities” run through its opinion.201 Justice Kennedy wrote
separately, joined by the three justices who also joined the Court’s
opinion, to “underscore that the apparent viewpoint discrimination
. . . is a matter of serious constitutional concern.”202 Petitioners did
not develop evidence of discriminatory purpose through discovery,
and because the case was only at the preliminary injunction stage,
such facts had not been presented or refuted at trial.203
But the Court’s selective recitation of facts, its multiple refer-
ences to the suspicious scope of the FACT Act’s coverage, and the
content of briefs filed in the case make reasonably clear the
199. Cf. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374 (quoting Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1328 (W. Pryor,
J., concurring)).
200. Id. at 2370 n.2.
201. Id. at 2374.
202. Id. at 2378 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 2389 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that petitioners did not, at any level of
review, present facts to support their claim that the Act’s provisions disproportionately im-
pact facilities with pro-life views); see Transcript of Oral Argument at 40–42, Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140) (exhibiting that Justice Alito cited an amicus brief that says 98.5% of
covered facilities are CPCs, but state counsel disputed that and said a state study showed a
significant number of non-pro-life centers covered by the Act and noted the information-gath-
ering problem because it depended upon centers self-reporting their covered status).
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evidence the Court relied upon to express its “concerns” that, de-
spite the facial neutrality of the California statute, unconstitutional
discrimination against petitioners based upon their “pro-life
(largely Christian belief-based)”204 viewpoint “apparent[ly]” oc-
curred.205
1. Disproportionate Impact
The Court’s suggestions that the notice provisions are the prod-
uct of unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination refer in large part
to the disproportionate impact of its provisions on the pregnancy
centers.206 The FACT Act identifies covered facilities according to
the services they provide or advertise.207 The Court’s suggestions
mirror petitioners’ argument that the description of services, com-
bined with the exemptions the FACT Act provides, single out preg-
nancy centers in application.208 The inference of purpose to target
pregnancy centers because of the viewpoints they express depends
upon its conclusion that the exempt facilities are the same as cov-
ered facilities with respect to serving the state’s asserted pur-
pose.209 But differences between the types of facilities exist. With
respect to the licensed center notice requirement, general practice
clinics require payment, whereas pregnancy centers offer their ser-
vices for free.210 The legislature aimed the licensed notice require-
ment particularly at addressing the information needs of low-in-
come women. Therefore, exemption of general practice clinics from
the notice requirement that applies to pregnancy centers can be ex-
plained by the different “patients the group[s] generally serve[] and
the needs of that population.”211 The exemption from the licensed
notice requirement of facilities that agree to enroll patients in state
programs that provide the full range of pregnancy services,
204. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2368.
205. Id. at 2378 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 2374 (“Tellingly, many facilities that provide the exact same services as covered
facilities . . . are not required to provide the licensed notice.”); id. at 2375–76 (citing Brown
v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011) (“If California’s goal is to educate low-income
women about the services it provides, then the licensed notice is ‘wildly underinclusive’” and,
therefore, “raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the inter-
est it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint.”)); id. at 2377 (the
unlicensed notice “covers a curiously narrow subset of speakers”).
207. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 123471(a)–(b).
208. See Brief for Petitioners at 62, Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140).
209. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2388–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (summarizing petitioners’
claims, particularly that the statute “does not cover facilities likely to hold neutral or pro-
choice views, because it exempts facilities that enroll patients in publicly funded programs
that include abortion”).
210. Id. at 2368.
211. Id. at 2386 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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including abortion, could be explained by a showing that these fa-
cilities are significantly more likely to inform patients about the ex-
istence of these programs than are the pregnancy centers.212
These reasons for the different treatment of pregnancy centers
and exempted facilities, especially at the preliminary injunction
stage, plausibly relate to characteristics of the pregnancy centers
other than their advocacy of a viewpoint and serve the legitimate
public policy purposes that the legislature articulated. Under the
methodology for determining whether the disproportionate disad-
vantage a law imposes on individuals shows a government purpose
to target them because they exhibit a protected trait, a plausible
purpose should be enough.
As women well know, even a perfect or near-perfect overlap be-
tween a targeted condition or status and a protected characteristic
does not prove a legislative purpose to target the characteristic in
Equal Protection Clause doctrine, even when attributes of the con-
dition or status link to fulfilling the legitimate purpose that the gov-
ernment articulates. Funding pregnancy benefits would raise the
cost of funding a disability insurance program, so the cost of the
condition—and not that exclusively women experience it—ex-
plained the exclusion.213 The information-delivery and waiting-pe-
riod requirements imposed exclusively on women seeking abortions
are not targeted at them because of the sex trait, rather the require-
ments fulfill the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring that “im-
portant decisions will be more informed and deliberate . . . .”214 An
absolute preference for veterans for state employment serves the
purpose of rewarding service, not disadvantaging women, although
it dramatically disproportionately did so.215 The state’s awareness
of the impact, and its attempt to ameliorate it with respect to low-
level clerical positions, did not change the Court’s conclusion.216
California’s explanations for its exemptions rely on attributes of
the condition of offering medical services to low-income women for
free, which is distinct from the viewpoint the pregnancy centers ad-
vocate.217 The exemption that depends upon agreeing to enroll
women in state services may overlap very significantly with centers
that do not have ideological objections to the contraceptive and
abortion services that the state provides. Like women’s conditions
212. See id. at 2389 (stating that the record needs to be developed to determine whether
this is true).
213. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 493–94 (1974).
214. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992).
215. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278–81 (1979).
216. Id. at 281–82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
217. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
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that stem from their biology or legal status derived from a separate
source of authority, pregnancy centers’ condition of not enrolling
women in state programs derives from their ideological objections
but the condition, not the protected characteristic from which the
condition derives, explains why the law treats them differently.
The Court’s serious concern that the law’s disproportionate dis-
advantage on pregnancy centers shows a legislative purpose to tar-
get their religiously motivated anti-abortion speech, when their ac-
tivities provide a plausible reason for the law’s distinctions, reflects
a different degree of sensitivity to unequal treatment than the
Court’s consistent refusal to draw an inference of a government pur-
pose to favor religious institutions in private school funding pro-
grams that foreseeably, and dramatically, disproportionately bene-
fit them.218 The Court adheres to this rule even when the provisions
of the aid programs overlap with the characteristics of religious
schools quite precisely.219 The theory that the Court has consist-
ently accepted, with respect to laws that dramatically dispropor-
tionately benefited religious schools, is that they were nevertheless
neutral because nonreligious private schools could choose to open
and become eligible to receive the financial benefit.220 So, too, in
California, nonreligious pregnancy centers could choose to open,
and they would be subject to the notice requirement. In both in-
stances, the likelihood is low, because religious motivation, and
funding from the religious organization for the purpose of promul-
gating belief, explains the existences of the schools, and pregnancy
centers, with the particular characteristics, specifically offering
lower tuition or pregnancy services for free. But the likelihood that
the relative proportions of benefited entities will shift does not mat-
ter to the determination of discriminatory purpose when the ques-
tion is whether the government unconstitutionally favors religious
entities. When the question is reversed, to ask whether a dispro-
portionate disadvantage shows a purpose to discriminate against
religious entities, it should not matter either.
The more generous standard the Court applies to find discrimi-
natory purpose under the Free Speech Clause appears like the mov-
ing standard under the Free Exercise Clause. It may be that the
Court will reinterpret the meaning of that clause to provoke strict
218. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 703 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(noting that 96.6% of all students participating in state voucher program go to religious
schools).
219. See id. at 704–05 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that a few open spaces exist at
the few nonreligious schools and the amount of the voucher mirrors full tuition at religious
schools, while tuition at nonreligious private schools is much higher).
220. See id. at 652; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993).
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scrutiny review on a showing less than a purpose to discriminate on
the basis of religious motivation.221 And even if it does not, the in-
consistency between the label and the methodology would be re-
stricted to the interpretation of the single clause, where an inter-
pretation could be that it provides a priority to religious exercise,
rather than equal treatment. But the core meaning of the Free
Speech Clause, as emphasized by the NIFLA Court, is to guarantee
equal treatment of all speech from multiple viewpoints.222 A pur-
pose to discriminate against a viewpoint, not a substantial burden
on the speakers, is its mark of unconstitutional action, and that
standard is not moving. So, when the Court uses the looser Free
Exercise Clause-type methodology to determine whether the gov-
ernment acts with a purpose to discriminate against viewpoints ex-
pressed by religious speakers, it seems to incorporate religious be-
lief into its interpretation of the scope of the free speech guarantee.
2. Direct Evidence
Although the NIFLA Court does not rely on it, the case provides
a vehicle to consider the type of direct evidence the Court has found
to overcome the facial neutrality of a government action to show
that the government decision maker acted with unconstitutional
animus. The NIFLA Court’s short, one-paragraph recitation of
facts sets the stage for the theme of unconstitutional viewpoint dis-
crimination by the California Legislature that runs through the
opinion. The first sentence targets the purpose of the FACT Act to
regulate the pregnancy centers, which it identifies as motivated by
a pro-life viewpoint and religious belief. It then selectively quotes
the bill’s author:
“[U]nfortunately,” the author of the FACT Act stated, “there
are nearly 200 licensed and unlicensed” crisis pregnancy cen-
ters in California. . . . These centers “aim to discourage and
prevent women from seeking abortions.” . . . The author of the
FACT Act observed that crisis pregnancy centers “are com-
monly affiliated with, or run by organizations whose stated
goal” is to oppose abortion—including “the National Institute
of Family and Life Advocates,” one of the petitioners here. . . .
To address this perceived problem, the FACT Act imposes two
221. See Fulton v. City of Phila., 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (mem.).
222. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
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notice requirements on facilities that provide pregnancy-re-
lated services . . . .223
By means of this series of sentences, the Court portrays the “per-
ceived problem” that the legislature sought to remedy to be the ex-
istence of facilities, which advocate from a pro-life and religious
point of view.224 Indeed, if burdening “some speakers whose speech
[the author] d[id]n’t much like” were the problem that legislature
sought to remedy by means of the FACT Act, the claim of unconsti-
tutional gerrymandering might raise “a serious issue.”225 The
catch, however, is that the meaning attributed to the author by the
Court’s quotations is not the meaning contained within the bill
analysis, from which the Court drew its description. The full quo-
tation reads:
[t]he author contends that, unfortunately, there are nearly 200
licensed and unlicensed clinics known as crisis pregnancy cen-
ters (CPCs) in California whose goal is to interfere with a
woman’s ability to be fully informed and exercise their repro-
ductive rights, and that CPCs pose as full-service women’s
health clinics, but aim to discourage and prevent women from
seeking abortions. The author concludes that these intention-
ally deceptive advertising and counseling practices often con-
fuse, misinform, and even intimidate women from making
fully-informed, time-sensitive decisions about critical health
care.226
So, this full description does not portray the “problem” perceived
by the bill’s author, or the members of the California Legislature
who voted in favor of the bill, to be the mere existence of pro-life,
faith-based pregnancy centers or their religiously motivated, anti-
abortion viewpoints. The bill analysis describes the problem per-
ceived by the author to be the conduct of pregnancy center person-
nel when undertaking the activities of advertising and counseling,
and the harm that conduct causes to members of the public, which
the California government has the authority and responsibility to
protect. These are very different meanings with respect to the
223. Id. at 2368 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
224. Id.
225. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 203, at 38 (Kagan, J.); see Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. at 2389 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f there are not good reasons [for the exemptions,] the
petitioners’ claim of viewpoint discrimination becomes much stronger.”).
226. Joint Appendix, supra note 121, at 84–85.
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inference of viewpoint discrimination, which the Court draws and
as to which it seeks to persuade readers.227
So much of the difference in meaning between the descriptions of
the author’s statements in the Court’s opinion and in the bill anal-
ysis hinges on what about the pregnancy centers, precisely, the bill
author judged to be “unfortunate.” If the author expressed a judg-
ment of dislike for the speakers because of their religious beliefs or
anti-abortion ideology, this judgment, by a lawmaker and if at-
tributed to the entire legislature, would support a finding of uncon-
stitutional viewpoint discrimination. The Court’s felt need to pre-
sent this meaning to support its tentative conclusion of discrimina-
tory purpose, as opposed to a meaning under which the focus of the
lawmakers’ judgment was on the actions of the speakers and the
impact of those actions on members of the public, emphasizes the
different constitutional significances of these two meanings. The
meaning the Court presents supports a finding of a discriminatory
purpose. The words the bill’s sponsor said, did not.228 Muddying
the distinction risks chilling criticism by lawmakers of conduct that
may be motivated by religious belief, which they have a First
Amendment right to express.
Another example from the same Supreme Court term under-
scores the threat to free speech by public officials, which the Court’s
merging of religiously motivated conduct with speech to find a pur-
pose to discriminate on the basis of the latter presents. By contrast
to the implication of viewpoint discrimination by the NIFLA Court,
the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission hinged its decision on a finding that the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission did not consider the case before it “with the
227. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991) (selective
quotations may form the basis for defamation liability if they do not meet the standard of
“substantial truth”).
228. The Court quotes loosely again when reviewing the unlicensed pregnancy center no-
tice requirement, which required the centers to post a notice informing clients they were not
licensed. The Court stated:
[t]he only justification that the California Legislature put forward was ensuring that
“pregnant women in California know when they are getting medical care from licensed
professionals.” . . . At oral argument, however, California denied that the justification
for the FACT Act was that women “go into [crisis pregnancy centers] and they don’t
realize what they are.”
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2377 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Court implied that
the state’s counsel denied that the purpose of the unlicensed notice requirement was to in-
form clients, who may not know the licensed or unlicensed status of the centers, what it was.
But the state’s counsel did not say that. The entire colloquy, which contains a subsequent
qualification by counsel about the statute’s dual purposes, shows that the questions and the
answers related to the licensed clinic notice. The quoted reference to what women do or do
not know when they go into pregnancy center did not relate to whether or not they were
licensed at all. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 203, at 44.
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religious neutrality that the Constitution requires.”229 The Court
declined to expand the scope of “speech” under the Free Speech
Clause to protect a business person who objected on religious
grounds from complying with a state public accommodations law
that required him to create and supply a cake to a same-sex couple
to be used at their wedding.230 Instead, the Court relied on what it
perceived to be different treatment of bakers with similar claims,
and statements by members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion to find that the commission violated the Free Exercise Clause
by acting with a purpose to discriminate against him because of his
religious beliefs.231
Perspectives may differ on the meaning of words, as the Court
acknowledges, with respect to several official comments that it cites
as evidence of the commission’s “hostility” toward the claimant’s
sincere religious beliefs.232 Nevertheless, the Court drew the clear
conclusion that one set of comments, by a commissioner, “dispar-
age[d the claimant’s] beliefs,” and that the comments, combined
with the failure of the commission as a whole, and the state in its
brief to the Court, to disavow the comments,233 “cast doubt on the
fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s adjudication of [the]
case.”234 The commissioner stated:
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the
last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used
to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history,
whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it
be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where free-
dom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to
me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people
can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.235
229. 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
230. Id. at 1723–32.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1729 (“Standing alone, these statements are susceptible of different interpre-
tations.”).
233. Pressed by Justice Kennedy at oral argument, counsel for the state disavowed the
statement, to the extent it could be interpreted to show a purpose to target the baker because
of his religious motivation. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (“JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you now disavow or disapprove of that
statement? MR. YARGER: I -- I do, yes, Your Honor. I think -- I need to make clear that
what that commissioner was referring to was the previous decision of the Commission, which
is that no matter how strongly held a belief, it is not an exception to a generally applicable
anti-discrimination law.”).
234. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–30.
235. Id. at 1729.
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The Court reasoned as follows:
[t]o describe a man’s faith as “one of the most despicable pieces
of rhetoric that people can use” is to disparage his religion in
at least two distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and
also by characterizing it as merely rhetorical—something in-
substantial and even insincere. The commissioner even went
so far as to compare Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held
religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. This
sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission charged with the
solemn responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colo-
rado’s antidiscrimination law—a law that protects against dis-
crimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual orienta-
tion.236
The Court noted further:
[m]embers of the Court have disagreed on the question
whether statements made by lawmakers may properly be
taken into account in determining whether a law intentionally
discriminates on the basis of religion. . . . In this case, however,
the remarks were made in a very different context—by an ad-
judicatory body deciding a particular case.237
A comparison between the expression of dislike the Masterpiece
CakeshopCourt interpreted to show hostility toward religious belief
by an adjudicatory body and the statements of dislike made by the
justices themselves in the course of adjudication is at least interest-
ing. Neither of theMasterpiece Cakeshop Court’s conclusions about
the meaning of the Colorado commissioner’s statement are inevita-
ble. The Colorado commissioner did not describe religious belief as
“despicable.” What he described as despicable was using religious
belief as the rhetoric that justifies conduct that “hurt[s] others.”238
Use of the word “rhetoric” does not necessarily imply that the beliefs
are insincere.239 In its traditional sense, rhetoric is the use of words
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1730 (first citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 540–542 (1993); and then citing id. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment)).
238. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730.
239. See Marc Gold, The Rhetoric of Rights: The Supreme Court and the Charter, 25
OSGOODEHALLL.J. 375, 376–77 (1987) (“The study of rhetoric currently enjoys a Renaissance
in a variety of disciplines. No longer pejoratively considered to be ornamental and usually
misleading speech, rhetoric is now understood to be an indispensable and inescapable tool of
practical reason in all domains of human activity.”).
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as a means of persuasion.240 The commissioner expressed strong
dislike for the use of freedom of religion as a tool to persuade listen-
ers that discrimination that hurts others is justified. And the his-
torical examples the commissioner offers are true, as is the phenom-
enon that freedom of religion has in the past, and is currently used,
to justify discrimination. So, the Court seems to say that a decision
maker acts with unconstitutional discriminatory purpose toward
religious belief when the decision maker acknowledges a judgment
of strong dislike for citing one’s own belief system as the justifica-
tion for conduct that interferes with others’ rights.
The NIFLA Court and concurrence use rhetoric strikingly simi-
lar, in words and meaning, to that used by the Colorado commis-
sioner to support his point of view. The Colorado commissioner lists
historical examples to illustrate the extreme consequences of ac-
cepting the claim of the litigant before the adjudicatory body. The
NIFLA Court lists historical examples from China’s Cultural Revo-
lution, Stalin’s Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Ceausescu’s Ro-
mania to illustrate the extreme consequences of accepting Califor-
nia’s claim that it may require licensed medical professionals to
post the informational notices.241 The Colorado commissioner ex-
presses extreme dislike for the rhetorical justification of religious
belief for the particular conduct that is the subject of the adjudica-
tion. Those concurring inNIFLA express strong disdain for the Cal-
ifornia Legislature’s “congratulatory statement” that the FACT Act
was part of a “legacy of ‘forward thinking’” with respect to the public
policy choice to be at the forefront of the nation in protecting
women’s reproductive rights.242 It is “not forward thinking,” the
concurring justices insist, to rely upon that ideology, in the Act’s
official history, as a justification for engaging in conduct which, in
their view, interferes with others’ rights.243 To be sure, “despicable”
is a strong word. But “egregious” is a strong word, too, and the
Court has placed this label on the conduct of government officials,
including by implication the members of the California Legislature,
who have acted according to sincerely held ideological beliefs.244
240. Id. at 377 (footnote omitted) (stating that the “traditional conception” of rhetoric,
“based upon the Aristotelian definition” is “as the faculty of discovering the available means
of persuasion in a given case”); id. (“Rhetorical analysis thus conceived involves the analysis
of the means used to persuade the audience that the result in a given case or set of cases was
justified.”).
241. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018).
242. Id. at 2379.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(funding religious speakers would violate the Establishment Clause).
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The selective quotation by the NIFLA Court to support its con-
cerns that a purpose to discriminate against the anti-abortion view-
point, motivated by religious beliefs, and the interpretation of the
commissioner’s words, and the failure of other government officials
to disavow the them, present the real possibility that the Court’s
increasingly fervent efforts to root out official discrimination
against religious beliefs will chill protected criticisms of the conduct
that results from them. A reasonable conclusion that both lawmak-
ers and adjudicators could draw is that it is safer to avoid acknowl-
edging the religious motivation of the activities they regulate or ad-
judicate at all, lest they get called out in the United States Reports
as having acted with a purpose to discriminate against deeply and
sincerely held beliefs rather than the conduct those beliefs com-
mand.245 And this silencing of statements acknowledging the reli-
gious motivation for conduct that hurts other people, and, although
a closer question, of criticism of religious belief as an appropriate
justification for such conduct, by public officials will hurt women
specifically, as they work to secure and maintain rights through the
democratic process, which they do not possess through the Consti-
tution. Whatever the movement in Free Exercise Clause doctrine
turns out to be, the doctrine of the Free Speech Clause is that reli-
gious viewpoints and practices are entitled to equal—but not spe-
cially advantaged—treatment with the viewpoints and practices
motivated by other ideologies.246 If this is so, then decision makers,
whether lawmakers or adjudicators, must have the freedom to ex-
press dislike for religiously motivated conduct, because of the harm
they perceive the conduct to cause to other people, without raising
the inference that their actions stem from a purpose to discriminate
on the basis of the religious motivation. Otherwise, because of its
special relevance to a finding of discriminatory purpose on the part
of official decision makers, religious belief has crept into the defini-
tion of the scope of the free speech right.
245. Elizabeth Clark, Symposium: And the Winner Is . . . Pluralism?, SCOTUSBLOG (June
6, 2018, 11:36 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-and-the-winner-is-plu-
ralism/ (“Public commentators on national media regularly and casually describe measures
promoting religious freedom as ‘religious bigotry,’ an ‘invitation to discriminate,’ ‘not about
religious freedom,’ ‘a fig leaf for intolerance,’ or the like. [In light of theMasterpiece Cakeshop
interpretation, i]f this sort of language is used or relied on by legislators, or especially adju-
dicative bodies, it now can be considered clear evidence of lack of neutrality.”).
246. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Police Dep’t
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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CONCLUSION
Women’s rights and religious liberty exist in tension. To the ex-
tent that the Constitution protects an individual right to one of
them, it prohibits those who prioritize the other from writing that
priority into law, binding everyone subject to it to the conduct, man-
dates, and prohibitions that priority mandates. The Court inter-
prets the point of equilibrium, and these interpretations fluctuate.
But over the years, by means of layered and cemented interpreta-
tions, a core truth has emerged to manage the tension between the
two important rights guarantees. This is that religious liberty may
flourish and reign within the clauses under which those who wrote
and ratified the Constitution intended to protect it specifically. But
outside the twin provisions that the Court interprets to define its
boundaries, it does not define the scope of constitutional rights
guarantees—those that protect women’s rights or any others.
Now, the Court’s aggressive interpretations of the scope of reli-
gious liberty under the explicit rights provisions threaten to cross
the line, injecting a priority for religious motivation into the defini-
tion of the scope of the free speech guarantee. The methodology of
interpreting the scope of women’s rights provides a baseline against
which to examine and check this spread. We can check that the
Court transparently traces the new doctrinal distinctions it makes
to implementing constitutional principles. Although we may not
agree with it, we will understand. Examining the reasoning for the
link to principle will reveal when it fails to exist. In these circum-
stances, and when claims of religious liberty appear in cases that
do not implicate the specific guarantees directly, we can examine
whether religious beliefs may have influenced the distinctions the
Court draws, and thus crept into the definition of the constitutional
right. We can also look carefully at the Court’s evaluation of the
evidence of the disproportionate impact of seemingly neutral gov-
ernment action to ensure that its conclusions adhere to the “because
of not merely in spite of” standard, which constrains the scope of
women’s equal protection rights. We can check its conclusions
about the words of government officials as well, to ensure that those
assessments’ separate meanings that show a purpose to discrimi-
nate against religiously motivated conduct, or the appropriateness
of religious beliefs as a justification for conduct that hurts others,
from a purpose to discriminate against the beliefs themselves, and
so do not chill the criticisms of religiously motivated conduct which
may attach to women’s efforts to secure rights though the demo-
cratic process.
